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Chapter 1
Introduction
Online advertising is a fascinating research area since it inevitably in-
volves rich data and unique research questions that are of interest in various
fields of business, economics, and engineering. During my doctoral studies at
McCombs School of Business, I had the privilege of interacting with practi-
tioners from this dynamically evolving industry. Through these interactions, I
was not only able to understand the key elements/players of the online adver-
tising ecosystem and business-to-business contracting practices, but I also had
the opportunity to learn first hand the day-to-day operations and decision-
making practices by the managers in the agency. These valuable experiences
were instrumental in developing research ideas and precisely pinpointing my
research questions.
Many researchers have investigated the online advertising industry from
various angles including, for example, how to increase online advertising ef-
fectiveness and how to make the real-time-bidding auction mechanism more
efficient. However, my experience with the online advertising agency made
me realize that there is a new angle to be explored, that there is a complex
underlying structure in which countless entities (e.g., advertisers, ad agen-
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cies, publishers, ad aggregators) as well as their interactions are present; that
is, there exists a digital supply chain of online advertisements, the charac-
teristics of which cannot be adequately explained by traditional supply chain
management literature. Given my background and training in supply chain
management, I became interested in exploring further the roles that each of
the entities play as well as the impact of their decisions and interactions among
them on campaign performance and system-wide profit.
In the early phase of interaction with the ad agency, we learned about
the company’s perceived economic role within the digital supply chain. The
agency perceived its role as exploiting economies of scale in media buying (ad-
vertising slot aggregator) and lowering search and transaction costs for the
advertisers who carry out online ad campaigns through the agency. As a re-
sult, the company’s decision-making structure centered on specialized groups
of managers who ran multiple campaigns on their respective platforms. How-
ever, I observed that there is a potentially more important economic rational-
ization for their role; they can also be information aggregators who leverage
this information to exploit synergies among channels increasing significantly
system-wide profits. Three distinct but highly related essays spawned from
this idea, and this dissertation is comprised of those essays. Below I outline
the key ideas of these three papers in more detail.
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Essay 1: Strategic Complementarities in an Online Ad-
vertising Supply Chain
This paper explores a supply chain of online advertising which com-
prises of advertisers, agencies, publishers, brokers, and their interactions. Us-
ing data from a publicly traded, multinational advertising agency, we explore
the intra- and inter-channel interactions in its digital supply chain, and an-
alyze the impact of interactions between channel structures on the agency’s
decisions and campaign performance. The extant literature, which offers ad-
vice on increasing the click-through-rate and/or conversion rate, has largely
ignored interactions within the supply chain. Further, the supply chain litera-
ture, while vast, has not focused on the domain of online advertising, and has
therefore not studied the structure or interactions in such a digital setting.
Through our empirical investigation using data on a campaign that lasted
382 days, we find that there are substantial vertical interactions and horizon-
tal synergies, the failure to account for which may lead to significant under-
spending and suboptimal performance. Incorporating such interactions and
synergies in the agency’s decision making can potentially increase the overall
supply chain profit by 78% over the status quo. In addition, we show that by
combining information from multiple channels and structuring contracts ap-
propriately, the agency can help further boost the performance of the supply
chain. Our results offer practical guidance for improving the performance of
the $239 billion online advertising industry through the analysis of various in-
teractions, information and profit sharing schemes. Our study also shows that
3
the agency, while currently organized by vertical media buying, should instead
be re-organized by campaigns in order to monetize the substantial benefits of
cross-channel complementarities.
Essay 2: The Effect of Organizational Design on Exploit-
ing Complementarities
Using a naturally occurring experiment, we empirically investigate how
a firm’s organizational design can affect its ability to exploit synergies among
business practices in the context of digital advertising. Specifically, we com-
pare the decisions and performances of two different decision-making structures
by managers in an online advertising agency: the centralized mode where a
single manager runs an ad campaign on two advertising channels simultane-
ously, and the decentralized mode where two different managers run the same
ad campaign in their respective channels. We find that the centralized mode
better recognizes and incorporates complementarities between the two chan-
nels into its decision making, while the decentralized mode fails to understand
complementarities and thus systematically fails in allocating the right amount
of resources in each channel, leading to less overall profit for the agency. Our
analysis demonstrates that the decision structure can make a difference in the
performance due to more effective exploitation of cross-channel synergies in
an online advertising campaign.
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Essay 3: On the Challenges of Detecting Complementar-
ities in a Structural Model
In the empirical literature in economics and information systems on
testing complementarities, no distinction has been made between (i) the ex-
istence of complementarities and (ii) whether decision makers recognize and
act on such synergies. To address this gap, we analyze how a decision maker’s
understanding of complementarities can affect the empirical evidence of com-
plementarity or substitutability within a structural econometric model. We
study the decisions of an agency in an online advertising supply chain with
substantial prima facie justification of complementarities across its channels
of operation. However, from actual observations of its operations, we have
inferred that the agency makes decisions without acting on such synergies.
We find that the instrumental variables (IV) approach establishes the pres-
ence of strong complementarities regardless of whether or not the agency acts
upon complementarities; however, two structural models, one in which the re-
searcher mistakenly assumes the decision process to incorporate complemen-
tarities, and the other in which the researcher is informed about the naive
decisions, fail to extract the interactions, and produce a significant bias in
the estimates, whereby they may even appear to be substitutes. Our results
imply that unless the researcher is certain about the decision maker acting on
complementarities, it is prudent to rely on the IV approach than a structural
model to establish the presence of and estimate the magnitude of complemen-
tarities. An important caveat, however, is that the IV approach can sometimes
5
be highly inefficient relative to the explicit structural model.
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Chapter 2
Strategic Complementarities in an Online
Advertising Supply Chain
2.1 Introduction
The global online advertising revenues will reach a staggering $229 bil-
lion in 2017, long surpassing spends on cable and broadcast television ad-
vertising in 2011 and 2013, respectively (Liu 2016). Along with the rapid
rise in spend on online advertising, sophisticated channel structures, pricing
mechanisms and technology-driven platforms have emerged to help advertisers
broaden their reach, find new customers and ultimately increase online sales.
With an ever widening set of choices of online media, advertising formats, and
pricing methods, a complex digital supply chain has evolved in this industry.
However, the interactions and decisions within the supply chain, which can
affect its performance, have not been investigated thoroughly in the extant
literature. What is the structure of this supply chain? How are the decisions
of various players affected by those of others, and what is their impact on prof-
itability? Are there any synergies across channels within this supply chain?
How can campaign performance be improved through information sharing and
other means such as profit sharing within the supply chain? These are some
of the research questions we address in the study.
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An online advertising supply chain consists of publishers, advertising
agencies, brokers, and advertising channels. We consider two distinct advertis-
ing channels: an advertising network and an advertising exchange for trading
impressions1 and/or conversions2 as shown in Figure 2.1. The advertising net-
work is a closed group of specific publishers analogous to a privately traded
market, where prices are determined through individual negotiations, while
the advertising exchange is a technology-driven digital marketplace that facil-
itates buying and selling of advertising slots with prices determined by a real-
time-bidding (RTB) mechanism. Major ad exchange operators include Google
DoubleClick Ad Exchange, Microsoft Ad Exchange, and OpenX. Publishers
upload advertisers’ creatives on their websites, and agencies help advertisers
with tactics to convey their messages, dispatch materials to potential cus-
tomers through publishers to achieve campaign objectives. Brokers aggregate
advertising slots from various publishers and sell them to advertising agencies
through the exchange platform. Individual publishers in the advertising net-
work are generally specialized in focus (e.g., sports, news, or entertainment),
while the exchange makes a wide range of publishers available, which the agen-
cies may not have found otherwise due to search costs and other constraints.
〈〈Figure 2.1 about here〉〉
Approximately 64% of 2016 revenues in the U.S. were priced on a
1An event that is counted when an ad is displayed on a webpage.
2An event that is counted when a customer interacts with an ad and takes a measurable
action such as purchasing a product or downloading online content.
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performance basis3, and 35% were priced based on cost per mille (CPM) or
impressions (Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB) 2016 Internet Advertising
Revenue Report). While performance-based pricing has been the lead pricing
model since 2006, many online advertising agencies use both pricing models
concurrently, and may even use hybrid pricing4 which constitutes approxi-
mately 1% of the 2016 revenues. Our study involves both performance and
CPM based pricing.
Prior marketing and operations management literature has primarily
focused on user interactions with online ads, and has implicitly treated the
supply chain of online ad inventory as a black box. Some studies offer advice
on how an advertiser can increase the click-through-rate (CTR)5 and/or con-
version rate (CR)6 of a campaign by investigating the interactions between
an advertising format (e.g., paid search, display, etc.) and consumers, while
putting less emphasis on potential interactions among the channels themselves
(e.g., [20], [45], and [54]). Research has also explored synergies across differ-
ent formats of online advertising (e.g., [58], [1], and [57]), but has paid less
attention to potential synergies between channel structures or between pricing
3In performance-based advertising, the advertiser pays only for measurable results such
as leads, downloads and sales. Pricing models in performance-based advertising include
cost-per-click, cost-per-lead, and cost-per-acquisition.
4Hybrid pricing uses a combination of a CPM pricing model and a performance-based
pricing model.
5CTR is the number of clicks on an ad divided by the number of times the ad is shown,
i.e., CTR = clicks/impressions.
6The typical industry definition of CR is the number of conversions from an ad divided
by the number of clicks on the ad, i.e., CR = conversions/clicks. In this paper, however, we
will define CR to be the number of conversions divided by the number of impressions.
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models within the advertising supply chain.
Aided by the opportunity to work with a multi-national advertising
agency7, our study takes an early step in analyzing the complete online ad-
vertising supply chain, tracing and quantifying the interaction effects between
channel structures and their impact on the agency’s decision making and prof-
itability. Specifically, we focus on interactions between pricing schemes as well
as between the network structure and the exchange platform. Conversions in
the two channels may not be independent of each other as the impressions
from both channels are targeted toward the same set of customers. The prima
facie justification of positive interactions or complementarities is that repeated
exposure across multiple websites may entice a consumer to click on an ad, and
even buy the advertiser’s product, as studied in the literature on interaction
between formats (e.g., [58], [1], and [57]). Another rationale is that an agency
can learn through historical data about the effectiveness of, say, impressions
from websites in the exchange, and apply such knowledge in choosing actions in
the network. However, [21], [22], and [23] show that there can be substitution
effects across advertising media. For example, [23] find that if highly targeted
plain text ads and more visually striking but less targeted ads are used in
combination, the two strategies are ineffective due to privacy concerns.
Based on the understanding we developed by observing the operations
at the ad agency, we model the decision making processes of a publisher in
7With offices in 11 countries worldwide, the company has over 5,000 active customers
with over 18,000 live campaigns and over 120 billion impressions per month.
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the network and the agency as a Stackelberg game. This model helps derive
insights into key drivers of the players’ decisions. We then apply such insights
into choosing a set of instrumental variables in our simultaneous equations
estimation procedure, and show that there are significant synergy effects be-
tween channel structures and pricing models. Specifically, we find that the
agency’s expected profit function is supermodular in the agency’s actions in
each channel, and that the number of conversions from each channel is su-
permodular in the channel impressions. We demonstrate via counterfactual
analysis that incorporating such complementarities in the agency’s decision
making process can increase the supply chain’s profit by 78% over the status
quo. Moreover, information and profit sharing schemes can more than triple
the agency’s profit, bringing it closer to that of a theoretical benchmark sce-
nario, where the agency and the publisher in the network are an integrated
entity. The key managerial implications of our research are that the supply
chain is more profitable when the agency shares information and/or profit
with the publishers in the network, and that the agency should restructure its
organization to facilitate information flow between decision makers in the two
channels, and implement cross-training or centralized decision making among
managers to fully exploit the effect of complementarities and realize maximum
benefits. Thus our study provides the rationale for a new economic role for
the agency, which creates value not only through economies of scale in media
buying, but also through information and coordination based intermediary
activities in the supply chain.
11
Our study contributes to the nascent literature on synergy effects in
online advertising, providing both analytical and empirical support for com-
plementarities between channel structures and between pricing models leading
to higher supply chain profits and levels of operation. Quantifying vertical and
horizontal interaction effects in the online advertising supply chain is useful for
the online ad industry, not only because it can boost profits, but also because
it provides a rationale to rethink internal decision structures within the agency
as well as information sharing and incentives along the supply chain.
2.2 Literature Review
Since our research is interdisciplinary in nature, we review multiple
streams of relevant literature including studies in online advertising effective-
ness, synergy effects in online advertising, supply chain coordination and con-
tracts, and empirical studies in supply chain management, which help identify
opportunities for analyzing the online advertising supply chain.
2.2.1 Online Advertising Effectiveness
Our research is closely related to the literature on online advertising
effectiveness. [33] study the effect of banner advertising on current customers’
repurchase probabilities, while [20] and [45] investigate factors driving con-
sumers’ search and conversion behavior in the sponsored search advertising
domain. [22] show that matching an ad to website content and increasing an
ad’s obtrusiveness independently increase purchase intent, but the two strate-
12
gies are ineffective when used concurrently. In a more recent paper, [54] ex-
plores the effectiveness of social advertising using data from ads on Facebook.
In contrast to the above list of studies, we study the effectiveness of
online ads taking into account potential interactions between ads in a multi-
channel context. Furthermore, we focus on the advertising agency’s role as
a decision maker of campaigns, and study its expected profit maximization
problem in a Stackelberg framework. Finally, we devise feasible schemes that
can boost the supply chain’s profit as a whole, and find a new rationalization
for the agency’s role as a digital intermediary.
2.2.2 Synergies in Online Advertising
Our study largely draws upon the nascent literature of synergies among
multiple modes or formats of online advertising. [58] show that organic and
sponsored search advertising have positive interdependence. [1] estimate a
hidden Markov model of consumer behavior and find that display and search
ads affect customers differently based on their states in the purchasing process.
[57] use a mutually exciting point process to show that display advertisements
stimulate subsequent visits to other advertising formats and eventual conver-
sions. [25] show that combining web and mobile display ads performs better
than when either web or mobile is used in isolation. [29] find that display ads
increase search clicks and conversions.
Our work differs from the above literature in two distinct ways. First,
prior literature does not consider the larger ecosystem of online advertising. In-
13
stead, these studies primarily focus on the interaction between ads on websites
and individuals visiting them, and analyze strategies to increase the likelihood
of clicks or conversions. By contrast, our model involves the larger supply
chain of online ads, starting from the supply side (websites) to advertisers,
and entities and channels located between them, which allows us to further
investigate different facets of this complex system. Second, the above litera-
ture does not study potential interaction or synergies between different pricing
models and between different platforms (e.g., network and exchange). In fact,
some studies have analyzed when to use a particular pricing scheme to the
exclusion of others (e.g., [44], and [27]). Our study demonstrates that these
pricing mechanisms and platforms are not mutually exclusive, and that ignor-
ing the interplay between these choices can lead to underspending. Thus, our
work complements the extant literature and provides detailed analysis to gain
a better understanding of underlying online ad supply chain structures that
affect campaign performances.
2.2.3 Supply Chain Coordination and Contracts
A supply chain consists of multiple decision makers possibly having
different incentives and information, which may lead to suboptimal supply
chain performance. This phenomenon has been widely studied in the eco-
nomics and operations management literatures; the first concrete analysis is
often attributed to [50], who first described the double marginalization prob-
lem. Ideally, a single decision maker would optimize the supply chain with all
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information at hand in order to avoid incentive coordination problems. Re-
searchers in operations management refer to this system as the integrated sup-
ply chain. However, integrating a supply chain may often be impractical due
to economic, administrative, and other constraints. As a result, to coordinate
the supply chain and improve overall performance, this stream of literature of-
ten focuses on contracts8, e.g., wholesale price contract ([30]), buy-back ([42]),
and revenue-sharing contract ([12]). Many studies in this literature use the
classical newsvendor model as the building block in a two-firm supply chain,
and find remedies that can coordinate the system, while contracts are evalu-
ated according to the following criteria: (1) coordination of supply chain9, (2)
arbitrary split of supply chain profits, and (3) administrative costs.
A significant body of research in this area has also studied the role of
information sharing in achieving supply chain coordination. Studies in this do-
main investigated the value of sharing of information coming from the demand
side, i.e., the value of giving the upstream members access to downstream in-
formation. For example, [14] analyzes the value of demand/inventory infor-
mation sharing in a serial supply chain, while [11] study the value of inventory
information from a downstream member’s perspective in a one-warehouse,
multi-retailer system. Our paper also focuses on information sharing from the
downstream part of the supply chain, but considers a unique online advertis-
ing supply chain setup, which has not been previously analyzed in the extant
8Exhaustive reviews on this stream of literature can be found in [10] and [15].
9The buyer’s decision should optimize the total supply chain profit.
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literature.
We depart from the classical newsvendor setting, and study an online
advertising supply chain with a different and a more complex structure involv-
ing vertical (intra-channel) as well as horizontal (inter-channel) interactions
within the supply chain, and different pricing and transfer payment schemes.
Due to the complexity of the online advertising supply chain and implementa-
tion issues, it is challenging to coordinate the supply chain. However, we show
via simulation and numerical analysis that with information sharing and profit
sharing schemes, the supply chain can increase its performance to a level that
is comparable to that of the integrated case.
2.2.4 Empirical Research in Supply Chain Management
A growing body of literature has focused on empirical analyses of a
gamut of issues in supply chains, including estimating unobservable cost pa-
rameters in the newsvendor model ([40]), the bullwhip effect ([5]), the value
of information sharing ([18]), and the effect of vertical relationships on per-
formance ([46]). [41] and [55] empirically verify the impact of supply chain
risk propagation on production decisions and firm performance. Some of these
issues also arise in our study, though in a digital setting, where vertical inte-
gration between the agency and the publishers is infeasible, and where not all
players in the supply chain have equal visibility into various decisions. As a
result, we develop solutions to these challenges that are distinct from those in
the extant literature.
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Another subset of supply chain management literature studies spillover
effects or interdependencies among business practices, integration capabilities,
and business resources (e.g., [32], [34], [37], [36], and [43]). [38], one of the
earliest papers in this field, find that complexity in product design and vertical
integration of production are complements, while [39] draw upon the theory
of complementarity (see, for example, [35]), and examine complementarity
among vertical integration decisions in automobile product development.
Our paper differs from prior supply chain management literature in
three ways. First, our focus on synergies between online advertising channels
differs from all of the aforementioned studies in supply chain management,
which often focus on a supply chain of physical products such as automobiles.
Our work on a unique digital supply chain not only provides a thorough anal-
ysis of the emerging performance-based advertising industry, but also opens
up new avenues of research. Second, one of the reasons providing direct ev-
idence of complementarities has been challenging in the extant literature is
lack of information on costs and values of business practices, which ultimately
hinders researchers in carrying out structural estimations. However, in our
setting we are able to identify the exact costs, values, and other drivers of the
decision maker’s decisions as well as vertical and horizontal interactions within
the digital supply chain, which enable us to empirically assess the presence of
complementarities. Lastly, while most of the empirical research in supply chain
management is descriptive in nature, we offer feasible recommendations to the
agency which can increase campaign performance in terms of the agency’s
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profit as well as that of the entire supply chain.
2.3 Decision Making Process
2.3.1 Decision Making Timeline
We first discuss the timeline of key decisions in the supply chain (Fig-
ure 2.2), which is based on our conversations with managers in the online
advertising agency as well as observations from the data. In the campaign
we study, the supply chain consists of the agency, a network in which the
agency runs ads on a single publisher, and an exchange in which the agency
buys impressions from a single broker. For notations that follow, we will use
subscripts E and N for the exchange and the network respectively. In the
beginning of a campaign, an advertiser and the agency negotiate the pay per
action (PPA) for the exchange and the network, pE,t and pN,t, the prices paid
by the advertiser to the agency every time an advertisement leads to a specified
measurable action (e.g., a sale, download, or subscription). These prices can
vary over the course of a campaign through aperiodic renegotiation between
the advertiser and the agency, and can also be different for conversions from
the network and the exchange. Once the PPAs are set, the agency decides
the following on a daily basis: (1) the number of impressions, xE,t, it wishes
to spend in the exchange given a (daily) CPM10 and (2) the cost per action
10In reality, the agency specifies a daily spend (which is dosed throughout the day) and
upper/lower bounds for bids for impressions in the demand side platform (DSP) which gives
access to real-time-bidding of multiple sources of advertising inventory. Through experience
with other campaigns, the agency has a good understanding of how many impressions its
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(CPA) offered in the network, wN,t. After observing the CPA offered by the
agency, the publisher in the network decides on the number of impressions,
xN,t, to spend on its website. Finally, conversions, yE,t and yN,t, are realized
in both channels, the agency pays the CPA for each realized conversion to the
network publisher, and the agency is paid by the advertiser for all realized con-
versions in the network and the exchange. It is critical to note that there is no
exchange of information between the network and the exchange. We observed
that cross-channel information flow is not allowed in the data management
platforms used by the agency. Naturally, the publisher in the network is not
privy to the transactions the agency makes in the exchange, and the broker
in the exchange has no access to the negotiations taking place in the network
between the publisher and the agency.
〈〈Figure 2.2 about here〉〉
The aforementioned decision making process in the supply chain allows
us to formulate the interaction between the agency and a publisher in the
network as a Stackelberg game. That is, the agency (the leader) first decides
on the CPA, wN,t, it is willing to pay to the publisher (as well as the number
of impressions for the exchange, xE,t), while the publisher in the network (the
follower) decides on the number of impressions, xN,t, only after observing the
CPA, wN,t. To characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE),
settings would result in given traffic and bidding information. As a simplifying assumption,
we model the agency’s daily spend decision as determining how many exchange impressions
to spend given their belief of (average) CPM on a given day.
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we first study the publisher’s problem in the next subsection, and in Section
2.3.3 we study the agency’s problem.
2.3.2 Publisher’s Problem
We model the publisher’s view of the conversion generation process
by defining the number of conversions anticipated by the network, yPN,t, as a
function of the number of impressions it spends in the network, xN,t, as follows:
yPN,t = A
P
Nx
αPN
N,te
uPN,t (2.1)
where uPN,t is a normally distributed random disturbance with mean 0 and
variance
(
σPN
)2
, and superscript P refers to the publisher in the network. The
uncertainty represents unpredictable variations in the number of conversions.
The coefficient APN is a positive constant, and α
P
N is the impression elasticity
of conversion. We model the publisher’s perspective of the conversion function
as a single variable function of the number of impressions in the network, xN,t,
because the publisher has no visibility to the agency’s decision on the exchange.
The publisher’s daily expected profit function maximization problem (PUB)
is given as
max
xN,t
piN = wN,t E
[
yPN,t|xN,t
]− cN,txN,t (PUB)
where wN,t is the CPA paid by the agency at time t and cN,t is the opportunity
cost of impressions per mille for the network publisher at time t. The pub-
lisher’s opportunity cost is generally not known to the agency. To estimate
the opportunity cost of the publisher, as we will show later in Section 2.4.1,
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we specify and estimate a simultaneous equations model of a profit maximiz-
ing publisher, which involves the publisher’s conversion function and a profit
maximizing condition, and estimate the opportunity cost as a function of total
traffic in the network. Specifically, we define cN,t = k (xT,t)
b where xT,t is the
total traffic in the network, and k and b are constants to be estimated. As
the traffic in the network increases, there are more impression opportunities
for the publishers, thus ceteris paribus the opportunity cost of an impression
decreases, i.e., b < 0. This is in sharp contrast to traditional advertising media
such as radio or TV, where high traffic also leads to a high opportunity cost.
Our data confirms the above intuition that the opportunity cost is a decreasing
function of the total traffic on the network, i.e., the constant b is negative.
It can be shown that the publisher’s optimal number of impressions,
x∗N,t, can be expressed as a function of the ratio of CPA and opportunity cost,
wN,t/cN,t:
x∗N,t =
(
APNα
P
N
(
wN,t
cN,t
)
e
(σPN)
2
2
)1/(1− αPN)
(2.2)
Equation (2.2) implies the publisher uses more impressions in the campaign if
the CPA is higher and/or the opportunity cost is lower.
2.3.3 Myopic Agency
We now investigate the agency’s problem. The agency considers the
best response of the publisher (i.e., how the publisher is expected to respond
once the agency selects the CPA), and decides on the CPA in the network, and
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the number of impressions to use in the exchange that maximize its expected
profit. Although managers in the agency have full visibility of decisions made
in both the network and the exchange through the data management platform,
we observed a decentralized structure of decision making and the complete lack
of cross-channel communication and coordination within the agency, as a result
of which the managers did not consider the interplay between the two channel
structures in their decisions. Thus, while ideally the agency’s perspective of
the conversion processes in each channel should be functions of impressions in
both the network and the exchange, to model the actual decision process we
witnessed, we define the agency’s myopic view of the conversion processes in
each channel as
yME,t = A
M
E x
αME
E,t e
uME,t ,
yMN,t = A
M
N x
αMN
N,te
uMN,t ,
where uME,t and u
M
N,t are normally distributed with zero means and variances(
σME
)2
and
(
σMN
)2
(and possibly nonzero covariances), and the superscript M
refers to the myopic agency. As in Section 2.3.2, the coefficients AME and
AMN are positive constants, and α
M
E and α
M
N are the impression elasticities of
conversion. The agency’s expected profit maximization problem (AP) can be
written as
max
xE,t,wN,t
piA = pE,t E
[
yME,t|xE,t
]− cE,txE,t + (pN,t − wN,t)E [yMN,t|xN,t] (AP)
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where pE,t and pN,t are the price per action (PPA) in the exchange and the
network respectively, cE,t is the cost per mille in the exchange.
11 Note also that
E
[
yMN,t
]
= AMN
(
x∗N,t
)αMN e(σMN )22 where x∗N,t is decided by the network publisher
as a function of the agency’s CPA decision, wN,t, as specified by Equation (2.2).
The maximizing condition then yields the optimal number of impressions, xME,t,
which is a function of the ratio of PPA and CPM in the exchange:
xME,t =
(
AME α
M
E
(
pE,t
cE,t
)
e
(σME )
2
2
)1/(1− αME )
(2.3)
The agency spends more impressions in the exchange if the PPA is higher
and/or the CPM is lower. The optimal CPA in the network, wMN,t, can be
expressed as a constant times the PPA, pN,t, in the network:
wMN,t =
αMN
1− αPN + αMN
· pN,t (2.4)
We will use these insights from the myopic agency’s problem, along with some
adjustments the agency makes based on historical data, in choosing our in-
struments in the empirical analyses.
11We do not specify a budget for any of the models discussed in this paper. The agency is
a well-funded publicly traded company, and it does not face any liquidity limitations forcing
it to forgo profitable advertisement opportunities. As a matter of implementation, to control
the campaigns, the agency sets a budget for each channel through their data management
platform, and once the agency’s spending reaches this budget limit, the ads will no longer
be served. However, in reality these limits are increased if the ads served are profitable in
terms of the resulting number of conversions.
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2.4 Data and Empirical Model
We use data from a publicly traded multinational advertising agency
that supplies advertisers and media partners with a wide range of online
performance-based advertising solutions. Our study focuses on a single ad-
vertiser who runs multiple online campaigns on the advertising network and
exchange through the agency. The advertiser provides an online service, and
a conversion for the advertiser’s campaign refers to a subscription to its web-
site. Over the course of 382 days covered by the data, approximately 300
million impressions were used, and 45,202 conversions were realized, leading
to a conversion rate of 0.015%. The advertising agency made a total rev-
enue of $233,110 through this single campaign. Table 2.1 provides descriptive
statistics for the campaign under consideration for 382 days.
〈〈Table 2.1 about here〉〉
Each row in our dataset represents a day in the campaign. A datum
(row) consists of the number of impressions in the network and the exchange,
the CPA bid to the network publisher, the number of conversions, revenue,
cost, and profit from the publisher in the network and the broker in the ex-
change. Using these numbers, we calculate the PPA and conversion rate for
the publisher in the network, and the PPA, CPM, and conversion rate for the
broker in the exchange.12 Moreover, we have the total number of impressions
12Since the actual CPM bids are not available in our analysis, we instead use the average
daily CPM as a proxy for the actual bids.
24
the publisher in the network used for all the advertisers that are using its plat-
form, and we use this number as a proxy for total traffic in the network. The
ad creative used in the two channels are identical in content, size, type, posi-
tion on the screen, and target geographic location.13 If a customer sees the ad
and clicks on it, he/she is directed to the advertiser’s webpage where he/she is
asked to subscribe to the website. The customer of course has a choice to leave
the website, but if the customer provides his/her information to the website
and creates an account his/her action is counted as a conversion.
The estimation process is carried out in three steps. First, we get
estimates of the publisher’s opportunity cost by specifying and estimating a
simultaneous equations model of a profit maximizer, involving a demand equa-
tion and a performance equation. Second, we estimate the agency’s decisions,
the CPA for the network and the number of impressions for the exchange,
using a set of instrumental variables based on the insights we gained from the
previous section as well as conversations with the managers in the agency. Fi-
nally, using the estimated opportunity costs from the first step and the fitted
values from the second step, we estimate the conversion functions for both
channels. We describe each step in more detail below.
13Both channels use medium rectangle banner ads with the size of 300 x 250 placed on
the right hand side of the screen above the fold, portion of a webpage that is visible to a
customer when the page first loads. Also, ads on both channels are targeted to customers
residing in the US.
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2.4.1 Publisher’s Decisions
The publisher’s view of the conversion process is defined as Equation
(2.1) and the publisher’s expected profit function is given by (PUB) where, as-
suming that the disturbance in the conversion function is normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance
(
σPN
)2
,
E [yN,t|xN,t] = APNxα
P
N
N,te
(σPN)
2
2 ,
and cN,t = k (xT )
b. After a logarithmic transformation, the conversion process
and the profit maximizing condition yield the following two equations for each
day t:
ln yN,t − αPN lnxN,t = lnAPN + uPN,t,
ln yN,t − lnxN,t = φ′N + ln
cN,t
wN,t
+ uPN,t + vN,t
where φ′N = ln
1
αPN
− (σ
P
N)
2
2
. The disturbance term vN,t is added in the second
equation to explain deviations from the optimizing condition due to manage-
rial errors. It is worth mentioning the difference in the nature of uPN,t and
vN,t. The disturbance u
P
N,t represents unpredictable variations in the conver-
sion generation process, which is largely due to the variability in the customers’
reaction to the ads. The disturbance term, vN,t, represents the errors made
by the managers in the agency. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the
correlation of those two error terms are zero. [60] note that the simple least
squares estimators are consistent and unbiased under normality assumptions.
26
Rewriting the two equations leads to the following system of equations:
ln yN,t − αPN lnxN,t − lnAPN = uPN,t,(
αPN − 1
)
lnxN,t − b lnxT,t + lnwN,t − φN = vN,t
where φN = ln
1
APNα
P
N
− (σ
P
N)
2
2
+ln k. We estimate the above system of equations
through weighted least squares while imposing cross-equation restrictions on
the coefficients. From the estimation results, we extract the publisher’s deci-
sion rule, x∗N,t (see Equation (2.2)), the optimal number of impressions on day
t, as a function of the network CPA, wN,t, and the network opportunity cost,
cN,t, which again is a function total traffic in the network.
2.4.2 Optimal Agency’s Decisions
We next investigate the agency’s decisions, the CPA for the network,
wN,t, and the number of impressions in the exchange, xE,t, on day t. Note that
if the agency is myopic, then its decision rules are given as in Equations (2.3)
and (2.4). We can verify this by estimating the following equations:
lnxE,t = µ0 + µ1 ln (pE,t/cE,t) + µ2LaggedConvsdiffE,t + µ3YearDummy + E,t
(2.5)
lnwN,t = φ0 + φ1 ln pN,t + φ2LaggedCRdiffN,t + φ3YearDummy + N,t (2.6)
There are some key features to the above equations that merit discussion.
Based on our analysis in the previous sections, we assume that the exchange
impressions depend on the ratio between the PPA and CPM in the exchange
while the CPA in the network depends on the PPA in the network. Third, we
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acknowledge that the PPA for both channels and the CPM for the exchange
may not be exogenously determined. We find, however, that the PPA for
both channels are not directly related to any of the variables we constructed
from the data set. Nevertheless, we observe that there are two distinct jumps
over the course of the campaign and minimal variations elsewhere. Hence,
we introduce two dummy variables, Shock 1 and Shock 2, to represent three
different levels of the PPA. As for the exchange CPM, we observe that it
largely depends on previous period’s CPM, cE,t−1, and the conversion rate in
the exchange, CRE,t−1. The higher the conversion rate in the previous period,
the CPM bid by the agency becomes larger in order to secure advertising
slots. Lastly, the disturbance terms, E,t and N,t, refer to the agency’s error
in its attempt to satisfy the profit maximizing conditions. To estimate the
agency’s decisions we specify an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix for
the error terms and estimate the system of equations via a three-stage least
squares estimation (3SLS) procedure. From this estimation step, we calculate
the fitted values of the (log of) network CPA, l̂nwN,t, and the (log of) exchange
impressions, l̂nxE,t, and use them in our final estimation step discussed in the
next subsection.
2.4.3 Conversion Functions
The last step of the estimation requires estimating the conversions from
each channel on day t, yE,t and yN,t. After log transformation the conversion
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functions can be written as follows:
ln yE,t = lnAE + αE l̂nxE,t + βE lnxN,t + uE,t (2.7)
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN lnxN,t + βN l̂nxE,t + uN,t (2.8)
If the sum of the coefficients in each equation is less than 1, as our empirical
analysis will later show, the conversion process exhibits decreasing returns
to scale; in this case each incremental amount of online advertising causes a
lesser increase in conversions, which may be explained as a result of advertising
saturation. The coefficients that are of particular interest to us are βN and
βE. These coefficient reflect the inter-channel or horizontal spillover effects,
so if the coefficients turn out to be positive, then we can infer that there are
positive spillover effects from one channel to the other. The error terms, uE,t
and uN,t, capture the randomness in consumers’ reactions. Note that we use
the fitted values for the (log of) exchange impressions, l̂nxE,t, which we derived
from the previous step of estimation. Our analysis in Section 2.3.2 indicates
that the number of impressions on the publisher’s website is a function of the
proportion of the CPA, wN,t, and the opportunity cost, cN,t, in the network
(see Equation (2.2)). We also observe that the publisher’s decision depends on
historically how many conversions it has delivered in the past. For this reason,
we also include the lagged number of conversions in the network, yN,t−1, as
one of the instruments for the network impressions, xN,t. Again, to estimate
the conversion functions we specify an unrestricted variance-covariance matrix
for the error terms and estimate the system of equations via 3SLS. Figure 2.3
visualizes our three-step estimation procedures.
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〈〈Figure 2.3 about here〉〉
2.4.4 Exclusion Restrictions and Identification
Since the endogenous variables are correlated with the disturbances,
the OLS estimators are inconsistent. As emphasized in [3] and [4], we can
use an instrumental variables (IV) framework to disentangle complementarity
from clustered organizational practices. This approach can provide a consis-
tent estimate of the synergy coefficients if one can find measures correlated
with the endogenous variables but uncorrelated with the error term. Our
analysis in the previous section yields a natural set of instruments: factors
driving the agency’s decisions, which are the network CPA, network oppor-
tunity cost, exchange PPA, and the exchange CPM. Moreover, we consider
additional covariates that are extracted from direct observation from the data
and our discussion with the agency. Table 2.2 below summarizes the endoge-
nous variables included in estimation equations and the excluded exogenous
variables in each of the equations.
〈〈Table 2.2 about here〉〉
The justification for exclusion restrictions are discussed in Sections 2.4.2 and
2.4.3. Since the number of endogenous variables is strictly less than the number
of excluded exogenous variables, the order conditions are satisfied. Moreover,
the systems of equations trivially satisfy the rank conditions and thus we are
able to identify all the coefficients in the simultaneous equations models.
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2.5 Empirical Results
The estimation results for the publisher’s problem is presented in Table
2.3.
〈〈Table 2.3 about here〉〉
From the parameter estimates from the publisher’s problem, we can extract
the publisher’s opportunity cost as an inverse function of the total number
of impressions (which is used as a proxy for total traffic on the publisher’s
website). Summary statistics for the opportunity cost along with the exchange
CPM is provided in Table 2.4.
〈〈Table 2.4 about here〉〉
Table 2.5 presents the estimation results for the agency’s decisions via
the 3SLS method. The positive and significant coefficients for ln (pE,t/cE,t) and
ln pN,t indicate that the number of impressions for the exchange and the CPA
for the network are positively affected by the proportion of PPA and CPM
in the exchange and the PPA in the network, respectively. Moreover, if the
number of conversions from the exchange is higher than that of the network,
the exchange manager exerts more effort in the exchange, and if the conversion
rate in the network is higher than that in the exchange, the network manager
increases the CPA for the network. Table 2.6 provides the estimation results
for the conversion functions. We find that the cross-channel spillovers are in-
deed positive and significant, providing strong evidence of complementarities
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between the two channels. A one-unit change in the log of network (exchange)
impressions induces a 10% (7%) increase in the log of exchange (network) con-
versions. Moreover, the coefficients satisfy the condition for supermodularity
of the agency’s expected profit function, i.e., the profit increase that results
from increasing both the number of impressions in the exchange and the CPA
in the network is greater than the sum of profit increases that result from
increasing either one in isolation. This shows that decisions for both chan-
nels should be made in tandem after incorporating their interdependencies in
the optimization model, and that a failure to do so may result in suboptimal
decision-making, i.e., possibly underspending on some actions.
Our results regarding the complementarity of conversions in the im-
pressions from the two channels adds to the nascent body of literature on
complementarities in physical supply chains (e.g., [38], [39]) that have found
synergies between practices, integration initiatives and contracting.
〈〈Table 2.5 and 2.6 about here〉〉
2.6 Supply Chain Coordination
In this section, we devise several schemes that can potentially boost
the profit level of the agency as well as the supply chain compared to the
baseline case, the status quo of the agency’s decision making discussed in
Section 2.3. We extract 7 days of data from the original dataset, and use the
PPA in each channel, CPM in the exchange, and the opportunity cost in the
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network to generate decisions, conversions, and expected profit to compare the
performances of each scheme.
2.6.1 Benchmark and Baseline
We first describe the ideal setting where the advertising network and
the agency are integrated. It is important to note that this benchmark is
not practical, since the agency does not own either the large publisher in
the network (or those in the real-time-bidding exchange). This analysis only
serves as a reference point to compare the performances of the actual and
proposed configurations of the supply chain. Moreover, due to the horizontal
and vertical complexities present in the supply chain, it is challenging, if not
infeasible, to achieve the same level of profit as the benchmark case with any
other arrangement; however, along with considerations of potential interac-
tions between channels, in Sections 2.6.3 through 2.6.5 we devise schemes that
will considerably boost the supply chain’s profit over the baseline case.
In the benchmark scenario, the agency decides the number of impres-
sions for both channels, x¯E,t and x¯N,t. We use notations y¯E,t and y¯N,t for
the number of conversions in each channel, where the over-bar refers to the
integrated supply chain. If the agency were to consider the inter-channel inter-
actions in its decisions, its view of the conversion generation processes in each
channel will ideally include impressions from both channels, in which case we
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can model the conversion processes as
y¯E,t = A¯Ex¯
α¯E
E,tx
β¯E
N,te
u¯E,t
y¯N,t = A¯N x¯
α¯N
N,tx
β¯N
E,te
u¯N,t
where u¯E,t and u¯N,t are normally distributed disturbances with 0 mean, vari-
ances σ¯2E and σ¯
2
N , and possibly nonzero covariance. The agency’s expected
profit maximization problem for the integrated case, which we refer to as INT,
can be written as
max
x¯E,t,x¯N,t
p¯iA = pE,t E [y¯E,t|x¯E,t, x¯N,t]− cE,tx¯E,t + pN,t E [y¯N,t|x¯N,t, x¯E,t]− cN,tx¯N,t.
(INT)
We derive the following result for the integrated chain case:
Proposition 1. Assume that β¯E and β¯N are non-negative, i.e., there are non-
negative spillovers across channels. Then the following statements hold.
1. The expected profit function piA is supermodular in x¯E,t and x¯N,t.
2. The optimal decisions, x¯∗E,t and x¯
∗
N,t, can be selected such that they are
non-decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-increasing in cE,t and cN,t.
The first statement in the above Proposition shows that supermodular-
ity at the conversion level leads directly to the supermodularity of the expected
profit function. This is due to the fact that the marginal cost of increasing
x¯E,t is independent of x¯N,t and vice versa (see Appendix for details), which
means the cross-partial derivative of p¯iA with respect to x¯E,t and x¯N,t is always
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non-negative. We will show in later sections (Sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3) that this
result does not necessarily extend to alternative supply chain arrangements.
The second statement asserts that there exist agency’s optimal decisions that
are non-decreasing in the other channel’s PPA, and are non-increasing in the
other channel’s cost of impressions. While this result may seem intuitive, we
show in sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3 that this may not necessarily be true in other
supply chain arrangements. That is, the Stackelberg structure which we in-
troduce in the next section may induce the agency to be more aggressive and
select the network CPA, wN,t, to be larger than the network PPA, pN,t, in
which case the agency’s actions may be increasing in the network opportunity
cost, cN,t. Moreover, if the solution pair is unique, it is guaranteed that the
properties in the second statement hold14. However, if the spillover coefficients,
β¯E and β¯N , are non-positive, the following result can be derived:
Corollary 1.1. Assume that β¯E and β¯N are non-positive, i.e., there are non-
positive spillovers across channels. Then the following statements hold.
1. The expected profit function piA is submodular in x¯E,t and x¯N,t.
2. The optimal decision, x¯∗E,t
(
x¯∗N,t
)
, can be selected such that it is non-
decreasing (non-increasing) in pE,t and cN,t, and is non-increasing (non-
14Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem ([53], Theorem 2.8.3) suggests that if the action set
is a compact rectangle in a Euclidean space, the parameter set is a partially ordered set,
and the profit function is supermodular in the actions, and has increasing differences in the
actions and the parameters, then the solution set is a non-empty compact sublattice for all
parameters, and that the greatest and least elements in the solution set is non-decreasing
in the parameters. Moreover, if the solution is unique, then the solution is a non-decreasing
function.
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decreasing) in pN,t and cE,t.
This result indicates that submodularity on the conversion level is car-
ried over to the expected profit function, and that the agency’s optimal de-
cisions are decreasing in the other channel’s PPA. Note also that even if one
of the coefficients, β¯E and β¯N , is zero, the results in Proposition 1 and Corol-
lary 1.1 still hold. If one of the coefficients is negative (positive), then the
supermodularity (submodularity) of the expected profit function in Proposi-
tion 1 (Corollary 1.1) is not always guaranteed, as it depends on the relative
magnitude of the PPAs and the conversion function parameters. In the next
section, we discuss how circumstances can change in a vertically segmented
supply chain with an independent publisher in the network.
To simulate outputs in the integrated supply chain scenario, we begin
by computing the agency’s optimal decisions. Specifically, in this setting the
agency decides the number of impressions for both channels, x¯E,t and x¯N,t.
The agency’s decisions are based on the first order conditions of INT, where
the number of conversions are generated from Equations (2.7) and (2.8). The
profit levels of the agency, the network, and the supply chain are calculated
based on these decisions and the number of conversions from both channels.
Next, we compare it with the supply chain profit generated by the agency’s
decisions in the baseline case, i.e., the myopic agency’s case. This profit is
obtained through simulation, and it is carried out in the following steps. First,
in order to extract the agency’s view of the impression elasticities, we follow
the steps in Sections 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3, but in estimating the conversion
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functions we exclude the impression variable from the other channel. That is,
we estimate the following two conversion equations:
ln yE,t = lnA
M
E + α
M
E l̂nxE,t + u
M
E,t
ln yN,t = lnA
M
N + α
M
N lnxN,t + u
M
N,t
This approach extracts the agency’s beliefs about the impression elasticities,
αE and αN . Table 2.7 summarizes the results. Based on these coefficient
estimates, we generate the agency’s decisions, the exchange impressions, xE,t,
and the network CPA, wN,t, using Equations (2.3) and (2.4). The publisher’s
decision, the number of impressions in the network, xN,t, is then generated
based on Equation (2.2). The realized profit levels of the agency, the network,
and the supply chain are calculated accordingly.
The decisions from the agency and the network as well as the profit
levels for the agency and the supply chain are provided in Table 2.8.15 We
observe that the optimal profit levels for the agency and the supply chain
are more than four times the profits in the baseline scenario. The operating
level in each channel has also increased dramatically relative to the benchmark
case. We acknowledge these are out-of-range figures, and that such operating
levels may not be achieved in reality due to various constraints; however,
these numbers suggest that there is a significant upside potential, and that it
15We also provide decisions and profit levels from the actual data set in Table 8. The
difference between the actual data and the baseline case numbers are due to managerial
errors within the agency and the network publisher.
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is of interest to study how the agency can improve its performance through
acknowledging complementarity and utilizing different contract schemes.
〈〈Table 2.7 and 2.8 about here〉〉
2.6.2 Informed Agency Model
As noted earlier, multiple studies (e.g., [1], [31], [57], etc.)16 provide the-
oretical and empirical support for interactions across channels. If the agency
were to consider the inter-channel interactions in its decisions (we will call this
agency the informed agency), its view of the conversion process in a channel
will include impressions from the other channel as in the integrated supply
chain case:
yE,t = AEx
αE
E,tx
βE
N,te
uE,t (2.9)
yN,t = ANx
αN
N,tx
βN
E,te
uN,t (2.10)
where uE,t and uN,t are normally distributed with zero means, variances σ
2
E
and σ2N , and nonzero covariances. The informed agency’s expected profit max-
imization problem (IA) can be written as
max
xE,t,wN,t
piA = pE,t E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]− cE,txE,t + (pN,t − wN,t)E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]
(IA)
16These studies analyze individual consumer level data, and study complementarities
between online advertising formats such as display and search. Their focus is not on the
interactions within the advertising supply chain.
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where E [yE,t] = AExαEE,t
(
x∗N,t
)βE eσ2E2 , E [yN,t] = AN (x∗N,t)αN xβNE,teσ2N2 and x∗N,t
is decided by the network publisher as a function of the agency’s CPA decision,
wN,t, as specified by Equation (2.2). Note that the agency’s expected profit is
based on Equations (2.9) and (2.10) while using the optimal decision made by
the network publisher from Equation (2.2), and optimizing over this expected
profit function determines w∗N,t and x
∗
E,t. Thus maximizing the expected profit
with these conversion processes involves finding solutions to a nonlinear system
of equations given below:
∂piA
∂xE,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xE,t
− cE,t + (pN,t − wN,t) ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
= 0 (2.11)
∂piA
∂xN,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− E [yN,t] = 0
(2.12)
Although solving for the solutions requires numerical procedures, we can show
that under certain conditions, the expected profit function is supermodular in
the agency’s decisions, the CPA in the network and the number of impressions
in the exchange. We find that even if the conversions in the network and
exchange are supermodular in the impressions, i.e., the output elasticities,
βE and βN , are non-negative, the supermodularity of the agency’s expected
profit function with respect to the agency’s decisions, xE,t and wN,t, is not
guaranteed.
Proposition 2. Assume that βE and βN are non-negative, i.e., there are non-
negative spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂
2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
≥ 0. (A1)
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Then the expected profit function piA is supermodular in xE,t and wN,t, and
the optimal decisions, x∗E,t and w
∗
N,t, can be selected such that they are non-
decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-increasing in cE,t. Further, if wN,t ≤
pN,t, then x
∗
E,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
The above result suggests that if the spillover effects are non-negative,
and the sum of marginal benefits from both channels of increasing an action
while the other action is also increasing dominates the spillover effect of the
exchange impressions to the network (i.e., the third term in (A1)), then the
agency’s decisions are complements, and the optimal decisions, x∗E,t and w
∗
N,t,
are non-decreasing in the PPA in the network and the exchange, and are
non-increasing in the CPM in the exchange, cE,t. Moreover, if the CPA in
the network is less than or equal to the PPA in the network, then x∗E,t is
non-increasing in the opportunity cost in the network, cN,t. Note that in
Assumption (A1), all the partials and cross partials are non-negative if the
spillover effects, βE and βN , are non-negative:
pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂
2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
− ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
(+)
However, the equation can turn negative, hence turning the expected profit
function submodular with respect to the agency’s decisions, depending on the
relative magnitude of the components. For example, if the spillover effect of the
exchange impressions to the expected number of conversions in the network,
∂ E[yN,t]/∂xE,t, is too large, holding all others fixed, then it may become more
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profitable for the agency to reduce its effort in the exchange while increasing
its effort in the network (and vice versa). The same conclusion holds if the
efficiencies of the network impressions, αN and α
P
N , are too low, holding all
others fixed. This result is in contrast with that in the benchmark case, and
can be attributed to the vertical interactions in this model. In the benchmark
case, the marginal cost of increasing the network impressions is precisely the
opportunity cost of impressions, cN,t, and this cost remains the same regardless
of the increase in exchange impressions for the campaign, i.e., the marginal
cost of increasing the campaign impressions on the network while increasing
the exchange impressions is zero. However, in the informed agency case the
marginal cost of increasing the network CPA depends indirectly on the network
CPA itself through the expected value of network conversions, E [yN,t],(see
Equation (2.12)). Moreover, the marginal cost of increasing the network CPA
while increasing the exchange impressions depend both on the network CPA
and the exchange impressions. Therefore, the marginal cost of increasing both
actions is no longer zero. We can also derive the following result for the case
where the spillover effects, βE and βN , are non-positive.
Corollary 2.1. Assume that βE and βN are non-positive, i.e., there are non-
positive spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂
2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
≤ 0.
Then the expected profit function piA is submodular in xE,t and wN,t, and the
optimal decisions, x∗E,t
(
w∗N,t
)
, can be selected such that it is non-decreasing in
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pE,t (pN,t), and is non-increasing in pN,t (pE,t) and cE,t. Further, if wN,t ≤ pN,t,
then x∗E,t is non-decreasing in cN,t.
The above corollary suggests that the agency’s expected profit function
can turn supermodular even if the spillover effects, βE and βN , are negative,
depending on the magnitude of ∂ E[yN,t]/∂xE,t, holding all others fixed. We also
find that if the coefficient βN is zero, the supermodularity (submodularity) of
the expected profit function is guaranteed for non-negative (non-positive) βE.
However, if the coefficient βE is zero, or if one of the coefficients, βE and βN ,
is negative (positive) while the other is non-negative (non-positive), then the
supermodularity (submodularity) of the expected profit function is not always
guaranteed.
We now describe the simulation procedure for the informed agency sce-
nario. Using the impression elasticities from Section 2.4 for the conversions,
we generate the agency’s decisions, xE,t and wN,t, through Equations (2.11)
and (2.12). These decisions represent the agency’s decisions had it acknowl-
edged complementarities between channels and incorporated them into their
optimization. Plugging these decisions back into the conversion functions (2.7)
and (2.8), we get the number of conversions from both channels, and we can
calculate the profit levels for the agency, the network, and the supply chain.
We can see from Table 2.8 that in the informed agency case, the agency’s profit
level increases by 30% over the baseline, and the supply chain’s profit level al-
most doubles. That is, the agency can exploit its informational advantage in
better allocating its budget to both channels not only to achieve higher profit
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but also to increase that of the other players in the supply chain. Acknowledg-
ing complementarities between channels clearly boosts the profit levels of the
agency and the supply chain, but there exists a large gap between the profit
levels of the informed agency case and the benchmark. To help reduce this
difference, we devise several implementable supply chain contracts involving
information and profit sharing.
2.6.3 Information Sharing
We first consider an information sharing scheme for the agency. As
mentioned before, the publisher in the network does not have visibility into
the transactions between the exchange and the agency. Thus, the publisher
cannot assess potential interactions with the exchange. Our analysis shows
that if the agency chooses to share the transaction information on the exchange
with the publisher, the supply chain profit can more than triple. Specifically,
with the updated information from the agency, the publisher’s perspective on
the conversion process now becomes
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN lnxN,t + βN lnxE,t + uN,t
where the coefficients, αN and βN , are from Equation (2.8). The publisher’s
optimal decision now becomes a function of both the number of impressions
in the exchange and the ratio of CPA and opportunity cost as given below:
x∗N,t =
(
ANαN
(
wN,t
cN,t
)
xβNE,te
(σN )
2
2
)1/(1− αN )
(2.13)
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Moreover, since the sign of the coefficient, βN , is positive, i.e., there is a pos-
itive spillover effect from the exchange to the network, the publisher’s opti-
mal decision, x∗N,t(xE,t), is increasing in the number of impressions the agency
chooses in the exchange. Given the publisher’s decision, the agency’s expected
profit maximization problem is changed accordingly. We can show that under
certain conditions, the agency’s expected profit function is supermodular in
the agency’s decisions. We will use IS to represent the information sharing
scenario.
Proposition 3. Assume that βE and βN are non-negative, i.e., there are non-
negative spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
(
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
−
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)(
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
≥ 0.
(A2)
Then the expected profit function piA is supermodular in xE,t and wN,t, and
the optimal decisions, xISE,t and w
IS
N,t, can be selected such that they are non-
decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-increasing in cE,t. Further, if wN,t ≤
pN,t, then x
IS
E,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
The condition A2 appears more complex than condition A1 of Propo-
sition 2, which is largely due to the fact that in the information sharing case
the publisher’s decision, x∗N,t, also depends on the exchange impressions, xE,t.
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However, the intuition behind the result remains similar. That is, if the cross-
channel spillover effects are non-negative, and the sum of the marginal benefits
from both channels of increasing an action while the other action is also in-
creasing dominates the spillover effect of the exchange impressions to the net-
work, then the agency’s decisions are complements, and the optimal decisions,
xISE,t and w
IS
N,t, are non-decreasing in the PPA in both channels, and are non-
increasing in the CPM in the exchange. It is worth noting, however, that the
spillover effect of the exchange impressions to the network can be larger than
that of the informed agency case due to the extra term,
∂ E[yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
. The
exchange impressions can affect the network conversions through the pub-
lisher’s impressions since in this case the publisher’s impressions depend on
the exchange impressions. More precisely, the marginal cost of increasing
both actions simultaneously can be larger than that of the informed agency
case because the change in the marginal cost of increasing the network CPA as
the agency increases the exchange impressions is affected not only by the direct
impact of exchange impressions on the expected number of network conver-
sions but also by the indirect impact of exchange impressions on the expected
number of network conversions through network impressions (see proof in the
appendix for detailed expressions). The above result also suggests that if the
CPA in the network is less than or equal to the PPA in the network, then the
optimal number of exchange impressions is non-increasing in the opportunity
cost in the network. We find that the agency’s profit can be increased by 166%
over the baseline case through information sharing (see Table 2.8). We can
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also derive the following result for the case where the spillover effects, βE and
βN , are non-positive.
Corollary 3.1. Assume that βE and βN are non-positive, i.e., there are non-
positive spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
(
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
−
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)(
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
≤ 0.
Then the expected profit function piA is submodular in xE,t and wN,t, and the
optimal decisions, xISE,t
(
wISN,t
)
, can be selected such that it is non-decreasing in
pE,t (pN,t), and is non-increasing in pN,t (pE,t) and cE,t. Further, if wN,t ≤ pN,t,
then xISE,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
The intuition behind the above result is similar to that of Corollary
2.1.
2.6.4 Publisher’s Profit Sharing Contract
The supply chain profit can be increased even more by devising profit
sharing schemes. First, suppose that a contract is negotiated in which the
publisher shares a portion, (1 − γ), of its profit with the agency in exchange
for the information shared by the agency. The publisher’s expected profit
maximization problem is then given as
max
xN,t
piN = γ (wN,t E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]− cN,txN,t)
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while the agency’s expected profit maximization problem (PPS) is given as
max
xE,t,wN,t
piA = pE,t E [yE,t]− cE,txE,t + (pN,t − wN,t)E [yN,t]
+ (1− γ) (wN,t E [yN,t]− cN,txN,t) (PPS)
We emphasize that the expected number of conversions on the network as esti-
mated by the network, E [yN,t], now includes knowledge about the impressions
in the agency bought in the exchange. Notice that if the publisher’s share
γ is 1, then the agency’s problem reduces to the informed agency’s problem,
and if γ is 0, the problem reduces to the integrated chain scenario. In this
profit sharing scheme, who determines the share, γ, can be critical. Suppose
the agency has higher bargaining power than the publisher, i.e., the agency
chooses γ.17 It is straightforward to see that the publisher’s decision, x∗N,t, does
not directly depend on γ (but it depends indirectly on γ through the network
CPA, wN,t), since given the updated information about the exchange impres-
sions the publisher’s decision is given as in Equation (2.13). Note, however,
that the agency’s decisions do depend on the choice of γ, i.e., the exchange
impressions, xE,t, and the network CPA, wN,t, are functions of γ. We can
derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let k =
cN,tx
∗
N,t
wN,t E[yN,t]
, the publisher’s cost-benefit ratio (cost over
expected revenue). If k ≤ 1, then the optimal decisions, xPPSE and wPPSN , can
be selected such that it is non-decreasing in γ.
17For example, if the publisher is a local grocery store website, the agency will have a
stronger bargaining power.
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The above proposition suggests that if the publisher’s cost-benefit ratio
is less than or equal to 1, i.e., if the cost of impressions is less than or equal to
the expected revenue, then the agency’s optimal decisions are non-decreasing
in the agency’s share of the publisher’s profit.
Now suppose the publisher has more bargaining power than the agency,
i.e., the publisher chooses its share γ.18 Then it becomes a three-stage game
between the agency and the publisher. The publisher announces γ, and the
agency decides on the exchange impressions and the network CPA in response.
Finally, based on the agency’s decisions the publisher determines the network
impressions. Table 2.8 presents the simulation results for both scenarios. We
find that the agency’s profit can be increased by 166% to 272% over the baseline
case, depending on the bargaining power between the agency and the publisher.
We can also verify that the higher the agency’s share, (1− γ), the higher the
operating levels of the agency. Our discussion is presented in the form of a
party, the one with greater bargaining power, making the decision about γ and
imposing on the other; in general the value of γ is determined by a bargaining
process.
2.6.5 Agency’s Profit Sharing Contract
The second profit sharing scheme is related to altering the agency’s pay-
ment structure to the publisher and the agency’s decision variables. Specif-
18An example of this would be the agency working with large publishers such as Facebook
or AOL.
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ically, the agency pays the publisher on a CPM basis instead of the CPA
method, and offers to share with the publisher the revenue from the adver-
tiser less the cost of impressions. The agency’s expected profit maximization
problem, which we refer to as APS, can be written as
max
xE,t
piA = pE,t E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]− cE,txE,t + γ (pN,t E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]− cN,txN,t)
(APS)
while the publisher’s problem is now changed to
max
xN,t
piN = (1− γ) (pN,t E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]− cN,txN,t)
Notice that in this scenario the agency has one decision variable, the exchange
impressions xE,t. If γ is equal to 1, the agency’s problem reduces to the
integrated chain case. As in the publisher’s profit sharing case, the bargaining
power between the two parties plays a major role. Suppose the agency has
more bargaining power than the publisher, i.e., the agency chooses γ. Then
again, the publisher’s decision, x∗N,t, does not directly depend on γ while the
agency’s decision, xE,t, does. We can derive the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let k′ =
cN,tx
∗
N,t
pN,t E[yN,t]
, the cost-benefit ratio (cost over expected
revenue). If k′ ≤ 1, then the optimal decision, xAPSE , can be selected such that
it is non-decreasing in γ.
This result implies that if cost of impressions is less than or equal to 1,
then the agency’s optimal decision is non-decreasing in the agency’s share of
the network profit. If the publisher has more bargaining power than the agency,
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then the interaction between the agency and the publisher again becomes a
three-stage game. We find that the agency’s profit can be increased by 163% -
239% depending on the preset profit sharing scheme, γ. Table 2.8 summarizes
the results. We can also verify the result in Proposition 5 by observing that
the agency’s decision, xAPSE,t , is higher for higher γ.
2.6.6 Discussion
As seen in Section 2.4, there exist positive spillover effects across chan-
nels. However, as we established from, for example, Proposition 2, positive
spillover effects do not necessarily guarantee economic complementarity, i.e.,
supermodularity of the agency’s expected profit function in its decisions, xE,t
and wN,t. For such complementarity to be achieved, certain conditions have to
be met for each scenario. We verified that the conditions A1 and A2 were met
for each respective scenario in our simulation analysis. However, it was not
always the case that the optimal network CPA is less than the network PPA.
In the informed agency case, the optimal network CPA was always higher
than the network PPA (notice in Table 2.8 that the mean network CPA is
the highest in the informed agency case), and in all other cases including the
information sharing scenario and the publisher’s profit sharing scenario, the
network CPA was higher than the network PPA at least once. This implies
that in order to exploit the effect of complementarities, it may sometimes be
profitable for the agency to forgo profitability in one channel and extract profit
from the other.
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Table 2.8 also includes in the last column the agency’s share of the
supply chain profit in each of the scenarios discussed earlier. In the baseline
scenario, the agency keeps 89% of the supply chain profit while the publisher
in the network gets 11%. In the informed agency case, however, the agency’s
share drops down to 65%. While the agency’s profit shows an increase of
30%, the network publisher gets to keep a larger portion of the supply chain
profit increase mainly because the agency is giving up profit in the network by
setting the network CPA higher than the network PPA in order to fully exploit
the channel complementarities. Once the agency starts sharing information
with the publisher, the publisher now incorporates channel complementarities
in its decision making so that the agency becomes less aggressive than in the
informed case. Consequently, the agency’s share of the profit increases to 69%.
With publisher’s or agency’s profit sharing in addition to information sharing,
the agency can extract a larger profit share as much as 84%, depending on
the relative magnitude of the bargaining powers between the agency and the
publisher.
While the simulation results show that there is potential of increasing
profit levels of the players in the supply chain, we acknowledge that the op-
timal operating levels may not be implementable in practice due to various
reasons. In Table 2.9 we provide how the profit levels of the agency, the net-
work publisher, and the supply chain will change in response to incremental
increases (2% - 20%) in the agency’s decisions. The first three columns show
the percentage increase in profits when the agency increases its decisions si-
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multaneously, and the latter three columns represent percentage increase in
the sum of profits when the agency increases its decisions individually. It is
evident that percentage increase in the former case is larger than that of the
latter, signifying the presence of economic complementarity.
〈〈Table 2.9 about here〉〉
Finally, Table 2.10 summarizes the agency’s share of the supply chain
profit19 in cases with different parameters than the original ones. Each row in
the table represents cases with different sets of parameters while each column
corresponds to the baseline scenario, the informed agency scenario, and the
information sharing scenario. The symmetric case is where we assume that
the network has the same impression elasticities of conversions, i.e., αME =
αMN = 0.6890, αE = αN = 0.6910, and βE = βN = 0.1016, and the same
costs, i.e., cE,t = cN,t, as the exchange. The case with different spillovers
refers to the scenario where the coefficients βE and βN are different (βN is
back to its original value, 0.0731). We find that in this case the agency’s share
increases in all three scenarios. Although due to the drop in spillover from
the network to the exchange the profit levels decrease for both the agency and
the network publisher, the publisher sees a relatively higher drop in the profit
than does the agency because there is less spillover effect from the exchange to
the network than in the symmetric case. In the case with different efficiencies
19Unlike the numbers in Table 2.8 which are based on simulated conversions and profit
functions, the numbers in Table 2.10 are based on the expected values of the counterparts.
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(αN and α
M
N are back to their original values) the agency’s share decreases in
all three scenarios compared to the symmetric case. In this case, the increase
in the efficiencies favorably affects the profit levels for both the agency and
the network publisher, but the agency enjoys a relatively lower increase in
the profit levels than does the network publisher. When we let the cost of
impressions in the network back to its original values (which are higher than
the exchange CPM), the agency’s profit shares increase in all three scenarios
compared to the symmetric case. As in the case with different spillovers, this
is because the publisher sees a relatively higher drop in the profit than does
the agency. The network publisher’s profit critically depends on the cost of
impressions in the network while the agency’s profit function does not directly
depend on it. Note that the status quo (or the original case) is the combination
of all three variants considered. Based on the numbers in original case, we
can infer that the effect of different efficiencies is dominated by the effect of
different spillovers and costs.
〈〈Table 2.10 about here〉〉
2.7 Conclusion
In spite of a substantial body of knowledge in online advertising on
interactions between channels and consumers, there is no analysis of the online
advertising supply chain, which has essentially been treated as a black box in
the extant literature. We analyzed the vertical interactions within a channel as
well as horizontal synergies between channel structures in an online advertising
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supply chain. Based on the insights from our discussions with the managers in
the agency, we modeled and validated the presence of strong complementarities
through simultaneous equations estimation.
Our study provides the rationale for a new economic role of the agency
in terms of information sharing and coordination activities. We showed that
information and profit sharing can substantially boost the performance of the
supply chain; yet the IT systems used by various players in the supply chain
are not integrated, and therefore do not provide visibility across channels.
For example, the publisher has no knowledge of choices made in the real-time
bidding systems. The agency, being in a position to observe both channels,
can provide the necessary information to the publisher to boost its own as well
as the supply chain’s performance.
Our results also underscore the need to redesign the agency’s current
organizational structure from specializing in media buying (the status quo)
to campaign based management, where one (or more) decision maker(s) in
charge of a campaign is (are) made aware of horizontal synergies as well as
informational aspects involved in the supply chain. Figure 2.4 illustrates the
agency’s current and our proposed organization structures.
〈〈Figure 2.4 about here〉〉
The status quo has separate and specialized groups of managers for the
exchange and the network. The current organizational structure reflects a ra-
tionalization of the role of the agency in the supply chain based on economies
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of scale in media buying and lowering search and transaction costs for the
advertisers; it is well-suited for exploring new publishers and brokers in the
two channels, and having access to their online content. However, our re-
sults suggest a broader rationalization of the economic role of the agency, one
that is based on the utilization of information, and one which provides a sig-
nificant increase in profit potential by considering cross-channel interactions
when making decisions for each channel. Hence, we propose that the agency
group together managers in charge of similar campaigns, and either integrate
the network and the exchange management teams or ensure through interven-
tions that they understand the impact of synergies on their decision making
and agency profits. Such structural changes will involve additional costs of
cross-training managers as well as business process changes to move from a
silo mode of operation to a more integrated focus on the overall supply chain;
nevertheless, our numerical results also show that there is a significant upside
potential from such an initiative. Our findings also show that setting the right
incentive system is also key to improved performance. The current incentive
system in the agency is based on the number of realized conversions each man-
ager extracts from his/her campaign. Naturally, the channel managers tend
to put less emphasis on the cost of impressions and even less on the potential
interactions across channels. A gainsharing system for each campaign may
motivate the managers to better work as a team and improve their campaign
performances.
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Tables and Figures
Total Exchange
Total
Network
Total
Exchange
Daily
Average
Network
Daily
Average
Mille Impressions 297,611 250,244 47,366 655 124
Conversions 45,202 28,713 16,489 75 43
Revenue 233,110 149,027 84,083 390 220
Cost 146,547 89,244 57,303 234 150
ROI (%) 59 67 48
Average PPA 5.14 5.14
Average CPA 3.42
Average CPM 0.73
Conversion Rate (%) 0.0152 0.0115 0.0348
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Endogenous Variables Exogenous Variables
(2.9) ln pE,t, ln cE,t Shock 1, Shock 2, ln cE,t−1, CRE,t−1
(2.10) ln pN,t Shock 1, Shock 2
(2.11,2.12) lnxN,t ln (ŵN,t/cN,t), yN,t−1, Y ear Dummy
Table 2.2: Endogenous and Exogenous Variables
Variables Conversion Function FOC
Intercept 0.9831 -5.3485∗∗∗
lnxN,t 0.7428
∗∗∗ -
lnwN,t - 3.8880
∗∗∗
lnxT,t - 0.8911
∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.8624 0.4511
·p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 2.3: Coefficient Estimates for Publisher’s Problem
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Min Median Mean Max
Network’s Opportunity Cost 0.6620 1.0922 1.2704 5.1881
Exchange CPM 0.0500 0.6200 0.7272 3.3100
Table 2.4: Network’s Opportunity Cost and Exchange CPM
Variables lnxE,t lnwN,t
Intercept 0.6647∗ -1.1207∗∗∗
ln (pE,t/cE,t) 1.4605∗∗∗ -
LaggedConvsdiff 2.2062∗∗∗ -
ln pN,t - 1.4416
∗∗∗
LaggedCRdiff - 0.0125∗
Year Dummy -1.8996∗∗∗ -0.0517∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.6775 0.4950
·p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 2.5: Coefficient Estimates for Agency’s Decisions
Variables ln yE,t ln yN,t
Intercept 0.5946∗ 0.5543∗∗∗
l̂nxE,t 0.6910
∗∗∗ 0.0731∗∗∗
lnxN,t 0.1016
∗∗ 0.8115∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.5267 0.8647
·p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 2.6: Coefficient Estimates on Conversion Functions
Variables ln yE,t ln yN,t
Intercept 0.8695 0.7819∗∗∗
l̂nxE,t 0.6890
∗∗∗ -
lnxN,t - 0.8048
∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.5239 0.8539
·p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 2.7: Coefficient Estimates on Conversion Functions for Baseline Scenario
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Agency Overall Agency
γ xE,t wN,t xN,t Profit Profit Share
(%) (%) (%)
Data 1,482 3.02 198 - - 97
Baseline 1,912 3.82 180 100 100 89
IA 4,122 5.38 696 129.65 177.65 65
IS 9,109 4.84 4,188 266.18 342.96 69
PPS
0.999∗ 9,112 4.84 4,192 266.30 343.05 69
0.322∗∗ 11,754 5.34 7,731 372.11 393.87 84
APS
0.001∗ 9,268 - 5,055 262.67 360.40 65
0.531∗∗ 10,475 - 5,306 339.36 364.17 83
INT 16,650 - 10,912 453.90 403.51 100
∗Publisher’s best option; ∗∗Agency’s best option
Table 2.8: Simulation Results
Simultaneous Increase Separate Increase
Agency Network Overall Agency Network Overall
2% 2.19 10.08 3.03 1.93 9.56 2.74
4% 4.16 21.16 5.98 4.09 19.02 5.69
6% 6.11 31.62 8.84 5.74 29.99 8.33
8% 8.20 44.76 12.12 7.75 42.44 11.46
10% 10.09 56.71 15.08 9.37 56.53 14.43
12% 11.93 71.42 18.31 11.13 70.01 17.44
14% 13.74 85.49 21.43 12.46 83.94 20.12
16% 15.40 101.87 24.67 13.72 99.64 22.92
18% 17.04 118.78 27.94 15.13 115.69 25.91
20% 18.57 136.88 31.24 16.18 133.67 28.77
Table 2.9: Percentage Increases in Profit Levels for Increases in Agency’s De-
cisions
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Baseline Informed Agency Information
Sharing
Symmetric 74.96% 56.66% 66.70%
Different Spillovers 82.33% 65.28% 71.79%
Different Efficiencies 68.31% 51.06% 60.75%
Different Costs 82.28% 60.35% 70.20%
Original 89.29% 66.77% 71.04%
Table 2.10: Agency’s Share of Supply Chain Profit
Figure 2.1: An Online Advertising Supply Chain
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Figure 2.2: Agency’s Decision Making Timeline
Figure 2.3: Empirical Model
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Figure 2.4: Reorganization of the Agency
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Chapter 3
The Effect of Organizational Design on
Exploiting Complementarities
3.1 Introduction
The management literature in organizational design has investigated
how firms should be organized (centralized, decentralized, or hybrid) to suc-
cessfully pursue business strategies in different contexts. The information sys-
tems literature, while replete with studies on testing complementarities among
IT practices, has focused less on how organizational design or governance mode
affects a firm’s ability to exploit the synergy effects (with very few exceptions
such as [19] and [52]). In this study, we empirically investigate how centralized
versus decentralized decision making structure in a firm can affect its ability
to exploit synergies among business practices and how this lead to various
performance measures in the context of online advertising.
We study an online advertising supply chain, which involves an online
advertising agency who attempts to sell a product using two different chan-
nels; a network of large publishers, and an exchange with real-time bidding for
impressions on publishers’ websites. The advertising network is a closed group
of agencies and publishers akin to a privately traded market, where prices are
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determined through individual negotiations, while the advertising exchange is
a technology-driven platform that facilitates buying and selling of impressions
inventory with prices determined by a real-time-bidding (RTB) algorithm. Ma-
jor ad exchange operators include Google DoubleClick Ad Exchange, Microsoft
Ad Exchange, and OpenX. The agency buys impressions from the two chan-
nels, and a conversion is realized when a customer carries out a measurable
action, e.g., a customer makes a purchase, provides information, or downloads
an app, in response to an impression. Then the agency is paid a price for
each realized conversion from the advertiser, and the agency’s profit margin
is the difference between the revenue they receive from the advertiser and the
cost they pay for impressions spent on both channels. Conversion generation
processes in the two channels may not be independent as the impressions are
targeted at the same set of customers. However, it is not clear if there are
synergies present or if there is a substitution effect. That is, we do not know if
increasing impressions in one channel will improve or hinder the effectiveness
of the impressions in the other channel.
When campaign managers launch a campaign, each manager is initially
in charge of one advertising channel with its own platform, and as managers
assimilate their respective platforms they tend to cross-train themselves and
manage multiple channels simultaneously. Hence, our data from a single cam-
paign naturally consists of two main parts: one that is produced by two man-
agers each controlling one of the two channels, and the other that is generated
by a single manager who is in charge of making decisions in two different chan-
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nels. More specifically, the ad campaign we study is initially run by a single
manager (Manager A); that is, Manager A is in charge of making decisions in
both the network and the exchange channels. After some time, another man-
ager (Manager B) becomes involved in the campaign, and s/he controls the de-
cisions in the network channel, while Manager A keeps control of the exchange.
Then in the last phase of the campaign, Manager B takes control of both chan-
nels. The data thus provides a natural experimental setting through which we
can econometrically verify which decision mode (centralized or decentralized)
creates super-additive value synergies from cross-channel complementarities.
We initially focus on quantifying complementarities between impressions on
the network of publishers and exchange platform in terms of their impact on
conversions in the two channels using a simultaneous equations estimation
approach involving instrumental variables. We then explore the effect of cen-
tralization versus decentralization on recognizing and exploiting the synergy
effects by simulating the agency’s decisions assuming different decision making
structures and belief systems of the agency.
We find that the centralized mode, with a single manager for both
channels, better recognizes and incorporates complementarities between the
two channels (the network and the exchange) into its decision making, while
the decentralized mode with two managers, one in charge of each channel,
fails to recognize the effect of complementarities and systematically fails to
optimally allocate the advertising efforts, leading to less profit for the agency.
Our analysis demonstrates that the decision structure can make a difference in
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the performance due to more effective exploitation of cross-channel synergies
in an online advertising campaign.
3.2 Literature Review
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to rigorously quan-
tify the impact of organizational design on firm performance in the presence of
complementarities between business practices. The relevant literature to our
work can be divided into two main areas: organizational design and synergies
in online advertising.
3.2.1 Literature on Organizational Design
Many scholarly articles in the management field have addressed the is-
sue of firms’ organizational design in relation to various firm activities (e.g.,
[49], [7], [47], [48], [56]). [56] study the impact of top management teams’
integrative complexity and decentralization of decision making on corporate
social performance, while [47] analyze how three different organizational struc-
tures (centralized, decentralized, and temporarily decentralized) moderate the
balance of exploration and exploitation of a firm. With more focus on the infor-
mation systems function, [7] propose theory of predicting a centralized, decen-
tralized, or compromise design solution between the corporate and business-
unit levels of management for systems development. We add to this literature
by, building on the economic theory of complementarities, quantitatively ver-
ifying how organizational design is associated with exploiting the effect of
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complementarities between two different business decisions. Another factor
that distinguishes our model is the unique context of online advertising and
the dataset that resembles an experimental setting, which allow us to empir-
ically verify the change in performance measures associated with the change
in organizational structure.
3.2.2 Synergies in Online Advertising
Our study largely draws upon the nascent literature of synergies among
multiple modes or formats of online advertising. For example, [58] show that
organic and sponsored search advertising have positive interdependence while
[1] estimate a hidden Markov model of consumer behavior and find that dis-
play and search ads affect customers differently based on their states in the
purchasing process. [57] use a mutually exciting point process to show that
display advertisements stimulate subsequent visits to other advertising formats
and eventual conversions. [25] show that combining web and mobile display
ads performs better than when either web or mobile is used in isolation. [29]
find that display ads increase search clicks and conversions.
Our work differs from the above literature in two distinct ways. First,
prior literature does not consider the decision making structure and/or process
by the managers who control ad campaigns. Instead, these studies primarily
focus on the interactions between ads on websites and individuals visiting
them, and analyze, for example, strategies to increase the likelihood of clicks
or conversions. By contrast, our study analyzes the decision making process
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of the campaign managers and how the firm’s organizational design affects
various performance metrics of the online ad campaign we study. Second,
most of the above-mentioned literature primarily focuses on quantifying the
synergy effects whereas our paper tackles the problem of how in the presence
of complentarities a firm can benefit from exploiting the effect by possibly
reorganizing its decision making structure. Thus, our work complements the
extant literature and provides detailed analysis to gain a better understanding
the association between organizational design and recognition/exploitation of
the effect of complementarities.
3.3 The Online Advertising Supply Chain
In the online advertising campaign we study, the supply chain consists
of an ad agency, a network in which the agency runs ads on a single publisher,
and a real-time-bidding exchange in which the agency buys impressions from a
single broker who aggregates advertising slots from various publishers and sell
them to advertising agencies through the exchange platform. In the beginning
of an ad campaign, the advertiser and the agency negotiate the pay per action
(PPA)1 for the exchange and the network, pE,t and pN,t, the prices paid by
the advertiser to the agency per each conversion. These prices can vary over
the course of a campaign through renegotiation between the advertiser and
the agency, and can also be different for conversions from the network and
1PPA is the amount of money that the agency receives from an advertiser every time an
advertisement leads to a specified action (e.g., a sale, click, download, or subscription).
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the exchange, though such variation appears to be minimal in our data. Once
the PPAs are set, the agency decides the number of impressions, xE,t and
xN,t, it wishes to spend in the exchange and the network, respectively, given
the cost per mille (CPM)2 in each channel. Then, conversions, yE,t and yN,t,
are realized in both channels, and the agency is paid by the advertiser for all
realized conversions in the network and the exchange.
3.3.1 Informed Agency
Multiple studies (e.g., [1], [31], [57], etc.) provide theoretical and em-
pirical support for interactions across channels. The prima facie justification
of positive interactions or complementarities is that repeated exposure across
multiple websites may entice a consumer to click on an ad, and even buy the
advertiser’s product, as studied in the literature on interaction between dif-
ferent formats. If the agency considers the inter-channel interactions in its
decisions, its view of the conversion process in a channel will include impres-
sions from the other channel as
yE,t = AEx
αE
E,tx
βE
N,te
uE (3.1)
yN,t = ANx
αN
N,tx
βN
E,te
uN (3.2)
where uE and uN are normally distributed with zero means, variances σ
2
N and
σ2E, and possibly nonzero covariances. The agency’s expected profit maximiza-
2The underlying assumption for the exchange is that every participant in the exchange
is a price taker. Moreover, the agency has a fair assessment of the CPM through extensive
learning before the launching of a campaign.
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tion problem can be written as
max
xE,t,xN,t
piA = pE,t E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]− cE,txE,t + pN,t E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]− cN,txN,t.
where E [yE,t] = AExαEE,tx
βE
N,te
(σ2E/2), E [yN,t] = ANxαNN,tx
βN
E,te
(σ2N/2). Maximizing
the expected profit with these conversion processes involves finding solutions
to a nonlinear system of equations given below:
∂piA
∂xE,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xE,t
− cE,t + pN,t∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
= 0 (3.3)
∂piA
∂xN,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
+ pN,t
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
− cN,t = 0 (3.4)
3.3.2 Myopic Agency
Although managers in the agency technically have visibility of decisions
made in both the network and the exchange through their data management
platform, we observed a decentralized structure of decision making and the lack
of cross-channel communication and coordination within the agency especially
during the second phase of the campaign where two managers are at play, as
a result of which the managers did not consider the interaction between the
two channels in their decisions. Thus, while ideally the agency’s perspective
of the conversion processes in each channel should be functions of impressions
in both the network and the exchange (as shown in Equations (3.1) and (3.2),
to model the decision process we witnessed, we define the agency’s naive view
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of the conversion processes in each channel as
yE,t = A
M
E x
αME
E,t e
uME (3.5)
yN,t = A
M
N x
αMN
N,te
uMN (3.6)
where uMN and u
M
E are normally distributed with zero means and variances(
σMN
)2
and
(
σME
)2
(and possibly nonzero covariances), and where the super-
script M represents the naive agency. The maximizing conditions then yield
the optimal numbers of impressions, xME,t and x
M
N,t, which are functions of the
price cost ratios in their respective channels:
xME,t =
(
AME α
M
E
(
pE,t
cE,t
)
e
(σME )
2
2
) 1
(1−αME )
(3.7)
xMN,t =
(
AMN α
M
N
(
pN,t
cN,t
)
e
(σMN )
2
2
) 1
(1−αMN )
(3.8)
3.4 The Data and Estimation
3.4.1 The Data
We use data from a publicly traded, multinational online advertising
agency. We focus on an advertiser who ran an online campaign using a pub-
lisher on the advertising network and a broker in the advertising exchange
through the agency for 180 days. The advertiser provides an online service,
and a conversion for the advertiser’s campaign refers to a subscription to its
website. Manager A was in charge of both channels for the first 57 days of the
campaign, and from the 58th day to the 120th day, Manager B took control
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over the network, while Manager A continued to be in charge of the exchange.
Lastly, from the 121st day Manager B took control over both channels until the
end of the campaign. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the campaign
under consideration.
〈〈Table 3.1 about here〉〉
Each observation in our dataset consists of a day of operations. A
datum (row) consists of the number of impressions in the network and the
exchange, the PPA values, the number of conversions, revenue, cost, and profit
from the publisher in the network and the broker in the exchange. We then use
this information to construct additional variables: daily conversion rates (CR),
CPMs, and effective costs per action (eCPA) for each channel. The typical
industry definition of CR is the number of conversions from an ad divided by
the number of clicks on the ad, i.e., CR = conversions/clicks. In this paper,
however, we will define CR to be the number of conversions divided by the
number of impressions. Also, since the actual CPM bids are not available in
our data, we instead use the average daily CPM as a proxy for the actual bids.
eCPA is defined as the cost of impressions divided by the number of realized
conversions resulting from the impressions. The ad creative used in the two
channels are identical in terms of the content, size, type, position on the screen,
and target geographic location. Both channels used medium rectangle banner
ads with the size of 300 x 250 placed on the right hand side of the screen above
the fold, portion of a webpage that is visible to a customer when the page first
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loads. Ads on both channels were targeted to customers residing in the US. If
a customer sees the ad and clicks on it, he/she is directed to the advertiser’s
webpage where he/she is asked to subscribe to the website. The customer of
course has a choice to leave the website, but if the customer provides his/her
information to the website and creates an account his/her action is counted
as a conversion.
3.4.2 The Empirical Framework
We use the classical Cobb-Douglas specification to test complementari-
ties between the exchange and the network channels, which has been the most
commonly used model in research relating inputs to output and testing com-
plementarities. The estimation process is carried out in two main steps. In
the first step, we estimate dynamic regression models (AR(1)) for the CPMs
in each channel with respective lagged conversion rates as regressors and use
the fitted values from the models to use as bases for the managers’ beliefs
about the CPMs in making decisions for the impressions on any given day.
Second, we estimate the conversion functions using an iterative three-stage
least squares (3SLS, [61]). [6], among others, suggests that iterative gener-
alized least squares approaches lead to global maximum likelihood estimates
in the limit, which implies that full information methods such as 3SLS can
be used in place of full information maximum likelihood (FIML). We describe
each step in more detail below.
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3.4.2.1 Dynamic Regression Model for CPM
When making decisions on the number of impressions to spend in each
channel, the managers in the agency form a belief about the daily average CPM
on a given day with the information at hand. To mimic this belief forming
process, we estimate dynamic regression models for the CPMs and use the
fitted values from the models as the agency managers’ belief. More specifically,
we observe that the CPM values are generally sticky, i.e., they largely depend
on previous period’s CPM, cE,t−1 and cN,t−1. They also depend on previous
period’s conversion rates, CRE,t−1 and CRN,t−1, respectively. The underlying
logic here is that the higher the conversion rate in the previous period, the
larger the CPM bid by the agency in order to secure advertising slots.
We thus estimate a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) dynamic regres-
sion model for each channel with previous period’s conversion rate as a regres-
sor. For the exchange we have
cE,t = θ0 + θ1CRE,t−1 + ηt,
ηt = φηt−1 + t
where φ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient and t is white noise which
represents the part of CPM that cannot be explained by this model. We can
write a similar equation for the network CPM. The fitted values from these
models, ĉE,t and ĉN,t, represent the agency’s belief about the CPMs which are
used to make decisions on the impressions.
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3.4.2.2 Estimation of Conversion Functions
Next, we estimate the conversions from each channel on day t, yE,t and
yN,t via 3SLS. After log transformation the conversion functions can be written
as follows:
ln yE,t = lnAE + αE lnxE,t + βE lnxN,t + γEPhase2 + δEPhase3 (3.9)
+ κETrend+ uE,t
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN lnxN,t + βN lnxE,t + γNPhase2 + δNPhase3 (3.10)
+ κNTrend+ uN,t
If the sum of the elasticities, α and β, in each equation is less than one, as our
empirical analysis will later show, the conversion process exhibits decreasing
returns to scale; in this case each incremental amount of online advertising
causes a lesser increase in conversions, which may be explained as a result of
advertising saturation. The coefficients, βE and βN , reflect the inter-channel
or horizontal spillover effects, so if the coefficients turn out to be positive, then
we can infer that there are positive spillover effects from one channel to the
other. We also include dummy variables, Phase2 and Phase3, which are 1
in the corresponding phases and 0 otherwise. Finally we include the trend
variable to control for trend in our regressions.
It is reasonable to think that in each channel’s conversion equation its
own impression variable is potentially endogenous. That is, exchange (net-
work) impressions, xE,t (xN,t), are correlated with the disturbance, uE,t (uN,t),
because it is very likely that there are variables that affect both the conversions
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and impressions in the same channel simultaneously. For example, increase in
total traffic on a website may drive both the impressions and conversions to
increase. Impression variable from the other channel has less of this concern
because it is quite unlikely that there exists a common variable that simul-
taneously affects, for example, both the exchange side conversions and the
network publisher’s impressions. Due to the above-mentioned endogeneity is-
sue, the OLS estimators are inconsistent. As emphasized in [3] and [4], we
can use an instrumental variables (IV) framework to disentangle complemen-
tarity from organizational practices. This approach can provide a consistent
estimate of the synergy coefficients if one can find instrumental variables that
satisfy relevance and exclusion restriction assumptions ([24]), i.e., they should
be correlated with the corresponding endogenous regressor (relevance) and
uncorrelated with the error term (exclusion restriction).
Our analyses in Section 3.3.2 yield a natural set of instrumental vari-
ables. In particular, the number of impressions in each channel is a function of
the respective price-cost ratios in each channel (see Equations (3.7) and (3.8)).
Therefore we use these ratios, pE,t/ĉE,t and pN,t/ĉN,t, as instruments for the
impression variables, xE,t and xN,t, respectively. Both of these ratios naturally
satisfy the relevance condition.3 In addition, we would expect that these ratios
affect the conversions only through the impressions because the general audi-
ence of the ads have no information about these ratios when they are making
their decisions to convert. It is also important to note that the error terms,
3There of course exists the assumption that the agency is a profit maximizer.
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uE,t and uN,t, may be correlated, i.e., the conversions from the exchange and
network can be simultaneously affected by a common unobserved exogenous
factors such as changes in consumers’ reactions due to an unknown event (the
correlation between exchange conversions and network conversions is about
0.53). To allow the error terms to be contemporaneously correlated, we use
the three-stage least squares (3SLS, [61]) approach, a feasible generalized least
squares (FGLS) version of the two-stage least squares (2SLS, [2]) estimation,
which leads to more efficient estimates. More specifically, we use the following
procedure:
Stage 1: Estimate via ordinary least squares (OLS) the endogenous
independent variables, xE,t in Equation (3.9) and xN,t in Equation (3.10),
using instrumental variables, i.e., pE,t/ĉE,t for xE,t and pN,t/ĉN,t for xN,t, as
well as the dummy variables and trend variable in Equations (3.9) and (3.10).
We then calculate the predicted endogenous independent variables, l̂nxE,t and
l̂nxN,t.
lnxE,t = ρE + λE ln (pE,t/ĉE,t) + ln xN,t + Controls+ νE,t
lnxN,t = ρN + λN ln (pN,t/ĉN,t) + ln xE,t + Controls+ νN,t
Stage 2: Using the predicted endogenous variables from Stage 1, we
estimate the coefficients in Equations (3.9) and (3.10) via OLS.
ln yE,t = lnAE + αE l̂nxE,t + βE lnxN,t + Controls+ uE,t
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN l̂nxN,t + βN lnxE,t + Controls+ uN,t
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We use these 2SLS estimates to predict residuals in the system of equations
estimation, which are then used to compute the contemporaneous residual
covariance matrix.
Stage 3: Compute the general least squares estimators of the system
of equations. We iterate the above process till the coefficient estimates have
converged.
In Section 3.4.3.1, we provide additional analysis to show the validity
of the instruments.
3.4.3 The Estimation Results
Table 3.2 summarizes the key results from each of the 3SLS estima-
tions, which indicate that there are significant synergy effects between the
network and the exchange. For example, a one percent change in the network
(exchange) impressions induces a 0.09% (0.07%) increase in the exchange (net-
work) conversions in the first phase. This shows that decisions for both chan-
nels should be made in tandem after incorporating their interdependencies in
the optimization model, and that a failure to do so will result in suboptimal
decisions, i.e., possibly underspending on some actions. Note also that the
exchange conversions were higher in phases 2 and 3 than those of phase 1,
while network conversions showed a decrease in phases 2 and 3 compared to
phase 1. While it is important to note that there are significant differences in
the number of conversions across phases, we need to take a closer look on the
conversion rates and/or profit levels to determine which phase was performed
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best. We will discuss this in later sections.
〈〈Table 3.2 about here〉〉
3.4.3.1 Validity of Instruments
The estimation procedures outlined in Section 3.4.2.2 is based on the
3SLS technique. In this section, we confirm the validity of the instrumental
variables by providing relevant statistics.
Table 3.3 provides the first-stage regression estimation results. The pos-
itive and significant coefficients for ln (pE,t/ĉE,t) and ln (pN,t/ĉN,t) indicate that
the number of impressions used in the two channels are positively affected
by the respective price-cost ratios. We also observe that both of the dummy
variables for Phase 2 and 3 positively (negatively) affect the exchange (net-
work) impressions. We observe this pattern from the 3SLS estimation results
provided in Table 3.2, i.e., the impressions and conversions move in the same
direction across different phases, which again underscores the importance of
looking at the profit level of the campaign (revenue from realized conversions
less the cost of impressions). Note also that the adjusted R2 values of the first
stage regressions are high (0.71 and 0.65), which shows that the instrumental
variables have significant explanatory power and justifies the relevance con-
ditions for the instrumental variables. Finally, the F -statistics for the joint
significance of the first-stage estimations are both over 10, suggesting that the
instruments are not weak ([51]).
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〈〈Table 3.3 about here〉〉
3.5 Simulation Analysis
3.5.1 Single Informed Decision Maker
In this section, we explore a single informed decision maker’s optimal
decisions had he/she recognized and fully exploited the complementarity effects
between the two channels in all three phases of the campaign, and compare
the results with the status quo. We use the PPA and CPM in each channel
to generate decisions, conversions, and profits to compare the performances of
each scheme.
We first describe the simulation procedures. Using the impression elas-
ticities for the conversions from Section 3.4.3, we generate the agency’s de-
cisions, xE,t and xN,t, through Equations (3.3) and (3.4). These decisions
represent the agency’s decisions had it fully acknowledged complementari-
ties between channels and incorporated them into their optimization problem.
Plugging these decisions back into the conversion functions (3.1) and (3.2),
we can generate the number of conversions from both channels and calculate
the profit levels for the agency, the network, and the overall supply chain. We
find that the simulated optimal decisions by the informed decision maker as
well as the number of resulting conversions are higher than the actual num-
bers from the data, and that the agency’s profit level in this simulated case is
higher than that of the status quo in all three phases. Table 3.4 provides the
mean values of the impressions, conversions, and the agency’s profit as com-
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pared to the status quo. We can see, for example, that the agency’s profit in
the single informed decision maker scenario for Phase 1 increases by 32% and
the operating levels for the agency more than doubles for both the exchange
and the network. Acknowledging complementarities between channels clearly
boosts the profit levels of the agency and the supply chain. That is, the agency
can exploit its informational advantage in better allocating its budget to both
channels not only to achieve higher profit but also to increase that of the other
players in the supply chain.
〈〈Table 3.4 about here〉〉
We further explore the agency’s decisions in the three phases. Specif-
ically, we investigate how clustered the agency’s decisions are by comparing
(partial) correlation between the agency’s decisions and cosine similarities in
the actual and the simulated scenarios.4 It is well known that complemen-
tarities imply that researchers should be able to observe two phenomena: (1)
the clustering of business practices, which is manifested through (partial) cor-
relations and (2) the simultaneous presence of the complementary practices
affecting business performance more than the sum of individual effects. We
verified the latter through IV estimations in the previous section. To better
analyze the decision makers’ capability of understanding and incorporating the
4Cosine similarity measures similarity between two non-zero vectors of an inner product
space that measures the cosine of the angle between them. Mathematically, given two
vectors A and B, the cosine similarity, cos θ, is represented using the following formula:
cos θ = A·B||A||2||B||2 .
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effect of complementarities into their decision making process, we should also
investigate how clustered the business practices are in all three phases. If the
decision makers (managers in the agency in our case) acknowledge and exploit
complementarities, we would expect that they adopt the practices jointly lead-
ing to high correlations and cosine similarity measures. Table 3.5 summarizes
partial correlations between the two agency’s decisions, exchange and network
impressions, in the actual and simulated scenarios, and cosine similarities be-
tween the actual decisions and simulated decisions. All correlations include
controls for differences in the price cost ratio between the two channels.
〈〈Table 3.5 about here〉〉
We find that in all three phases, the partial correlations between the
exchange and network impressions in the actual scenario are less than those in
the simulated single informed decision maker scenario. For example, in Phase
3, the partial correlation in the optimal case is 0.96 whereas it is less than half
of that in the actual case (0.40). We also verify that the correlations are higher
in the centralized cases (Phases 1 and 3) than that of the decentralized (Phase
2), which leads us to conclude that the centralized decision making structure
is better in recognizing and exploiting the effect of complementarities between
the exchange and network channels. Lastly, Manager A (0.48) is more capable
of embracing the effect of complementarities than Manager B (0.40).
The cosine similarity results also lead us to similar conclusions. That is,
the decision vectors in the centralized modes (Phase 1 and 3) are more similar
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to the respective single informed decision maker’s decision vectors than is the
decision vector in the decentralized mode (Phase 2). Specifically, the angle
between the optimal vector and the actual vector in Phase 1 is 12° while it
is 32° in Phase 2. This reconfirms the observation that the centralized mode
better exploits the effect of complementarities than the decentralized mode.
3.5.2 Informed Dual Decision Maker Scenario
We now explore a different scenario where there are two informed de-
cision makers, one in charge of the exchange and the other in charge of the
network. The decision makers acknowledge the effect of potential spillovers
from the other channel but makes locally optimal decisions by maximizing its
own channel’s profits. Specifically, the exchange manager’s expected profit
maximization problem is defined as
max
xE,t
piE = pE,t E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]− cE,txE,t,
while the network manager’s problem is defined as
max
xN,t
piN = pN,t E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]− cN,txN,t
and their optimal decisions are give as
xE,t =
(
AEαE
(
pE,t
cE,t
)
xβEN,te
(σE)
2
2
) 1
(1−αE)
(3.11)
xN,t =
(
ANαN
(
pN,t
cN,t
)
xβNE,te
(σN )
2
2
) 1
(1−αN )
(3.12)
The simulation procedure is similar to that in Section 3.5.1. We first
generate the agency’s decisions as given in Equations (3.11) and (3.12). We
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plug these decisions on impressions to the conversion functions (3.1) and (3.2)
to generate the conversions and calculate the profit levels of for the agency,
the network, and the supply chain. Table 3.4 reports the mean values of the
impressions, conversions, and the agency’s profit as compared to the status
quo. In Phase 1, for example, the dual informed decision maker’s scenario can
achieve 24% higher agency’s profit than what the original data gives us. It is
still 8% less than the single informed decision maker scenario. This pattern
persists in all other phases, which suggests that the large chunk of increase
in profit comes from the decision maker’s recognition of complementarities
between channels. A similar conclusion can be made by observing the partial
correlation values between the exchange and network impressions and cosine
similarity values between the actual decision vectors and the simulated ones.
In Phase 3, the correlation between the exchange and network impressions in
the dual informed decision maker scenario is 0.93, which is considerably higher
than that of the status quo (0.40) but is slightly less than that of the single
informed decision maker scenario (0.96).
3.5.3 Interrupted Time Series Analysis Framework and Results
When considering the impact of an intervention or policy change with
no control group as in our case, an interrupted time series analysis (ITS) can
be used given that there are multiple observations on an outcome variable of
interest in the pre- and post-intervention periods. The ITS approach offers a
quasi-experimental research design with a high degree of internal validity (see
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[13] and [17]). As statistical analyses used for ITS must account for autocorre-
lation in the data, we use autoregressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA)
based dynamic regression models. The standard ITS dynamic regression model
with ARIMA(p, d, q) assumes the following form:
yt = φ0 +β1T +β2xt +β3Txt +φ1yt−1 + · · ·+φpyt−p + θ1t−1 + · · ·+ θqt−q + t
(3.13)
where T is the time elapsed, xt is a dummy variable indicating pre-intervention
(0) or post-intervention (1), and yt is the outcome variable at time t, differ-
enced d times. Notice the predictors on the right hand side include both p
lagged values of yt and q such t. The coefficient β1 represents the change
in the outcome variable with respect to a unit increase in time (which shows
the underlying pre-intervention trend), β2 indicates the level change after the
intervention (compared to the counterfactual), and β3 is interpreted as the
slope change after the intervention.
The key outcome variables that we are focused on are the following: (1)
the angle between the status quo and simulated decision vectors, (2) the pro-
portion of the total status quo impressions to the total simulated impressions,
and finally (3) the proportion of status quo profit to the simulated profit. The
ITS analysis procedure is described below.
Step 1: Exclude outliers that are more than 1.5 interquantile ranges
(IQRs) below the first quantile or above the third quantile from the outcome
variables.
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Step 2: Fit an ARIMA-based dynamic regression model on the data
from Step 1 and use the Kalman filter ([26]) to replace the excluded values.5
Step 3: Re-fit an ARIMA-based dynamic regression model on the data
from Step 2.
3.5.3.1 Angle between Status Quo and Simulated Decision Vectors
The dynamic regression model for the angles between the status quo
and single informed decision maker’s decision vectors is an ARIMA(1,0,1)
model:
yt = 31.0803︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.4038
− 22.8396︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.9693
∗Phase 1− 20.7880︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.9388
∗Phase 3 + 0.7987︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0847
yt−1
− 0.4449︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.1202
t−1 + t
Standard error for each coefficient is reported underneath the underbrace.
We excluded the time variable and the interaction term between the time
and dummy variables because they were not significant. Moreover, the above
model led to better fit in terms of AICc values. We can observe that the
angle between the status quo and simulated decision vectors are significantly
lower in Phases 1 and 3 than those in Phase 2 by 22.84 and 20.79 respec-
tively, which implies that the agency tends to get the closer-to-optimal mix
of impressions when there is a centralized decision maker. We also conduct
5We can also use Kalman smoother. Dealing with missing values using the Kalman filter
is interpreted as extrapolation of the series while using the Kalman smoother is interpreted
as interpolation of the observed series.
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the Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation which yields a p-value of 0.91 so we
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the model does not exhibit lack of fit.
By design, the (single-group) ITS analysis has no comparable control group.
Hence, the pre-intervention line or trend can be projected into the treatment
period and serve as the counterfactual. Figure 3.1 visualizes the estimation
results and counterfactuals. The solid red lines on the graph represent the
predicted values in each phase based on the dynamic regression model, while
the dashed red lines represent the counterfactuals. For example, the dashed
red line in Phase 2 can be interpreted as the angle between the status quo and
simulated decision vectors if Manager A from Phase 1 continued to manage
both channels through Phase 2. The grey and black dashed lines represent
the 80% and 95% prediction intervals, respectively. We can observe that the
counterfactuals lead to significantly different results than the predicted values
in each phase (the solid red lines lie outside the prediction intervals), i.e., there
are significant level changes across different phases.
〈〈Figure 3.1 about here〉〉
Similarly, we can compare the status quo decision vectors to those from
the dual informed decision maker scenario. The ITS analysis yields the fol-
lowing ARIMA(1,0,1) model:
yt = 35.0904︸ ︷︷ ︸
1.6526
− 29.7370︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.2604
∗Phase 1− 25.7599︸ ︷︷ ︸
2.3343
∗Phase 3 + 0.7595︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0838
yt−1
− 0.3078︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.1188
t−1 + t
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Figure 3.3 illustrates the results. Qualitatively, this result is similar to that
reported in the single informed manager case.
〈〈Figure 3.3 about here〉〉
3.5.3.2 Proportion of Status Quo Impressions to Simulated Impres-
sions
Next we analyze the total spend on the impressions, i.e., we study how
the total advertising efforts change over time and across phases as compared to
the simulated scenarios. The ITS analysis on the proportion of the status quo
impressions to the single informed manager’s impressions yields the following
AR(1) dynamic regressions model:
yt = 0.2942︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0311
+ 0.2028︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0449
∗Phase 1 + 0.1234︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0442
∗Phase 3 + 0.3610︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0697
yt−1 + t
The Ljung-Box test for autocorrelation yields a p-value of 0.17. Notice that
the dependent variables are significantly higher in Phases 1 and 3 than those
in Phase 2 by 0.20 and 0.12 respectively, which suggests the total spend in
advertising in the decentralized case is considerably lower than that in the
centralized scenario. As in Section 3.5.3.1, we project the pre-intervention line
into the treatment period to study the counterfactuals (see Figure 3.5). It is
important to note that the predicted lines in each phase (the solid red lines) are
inside the counterfactual prediction intervals (the black and grey dashed lines).
This suggests that if Manager A continued to managed the campaign alone
through Phase 2, he/she would not exert significantly different advertising
87
effort than the status quo. Similarly, if the two managers in Phase 2 continued
to manage the campaign through Phase 3, their total spend in impressions
would not be significantly different from the status quo. This suggests that
the total spend in impressions is not impacted by the organizational design or
decision making structure of the agency in a counterfactual sense. The analysis
on the dual decision maker scenario leads to similar results (see Figure 3.7).
〈〈Figures 3.5 and 3.7 about here〉〉
3.5.3.3 Proportion of Status Quo Profit to Simulated Profit
In this section, we analyze the proportion of status quo profits to sim-
ulated profits. The ITS analysis gives us the following regression model:
yt = 0.1588︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.1022
+ 0.0029︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0011
T + 0.5220︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0803
∗Phase 1− 0.0045︸ ︷︷ ︸
0.0813
∗Phase 3 + t
Notice in this model we have a positive trend line as well, which suggests that
as time progresses the agency becomes more cost-effective. It is also important
to note that the coefficient for Phase 3 is not significant, i.e., there is no
significance level change from Phase 2 to Phase 3. A counterfactual analysis
yields Figure 3.9. There is a key difference between this counterfactual result
with that in Section 3.5.3.2. Recall that the total spend in impressions was
not impacted by the organizational structure in a counterfactual sense. In
other words, when we projected the pre-intervention line into the treatment
period, the counterfactual prediction intervals included the predicted lines in
both Phases 2 and 3. However, notice from Figure 3.9 that it is not the case
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here in Phase 2. The solid red line lies outside the counterfactual prediction
interval. This implies that the there clearly is a level change from Phase 1 to
Phase 2 in a counterfactual sense. Notice also that this does not hold in Phase
3, i.e., there is no significant level change from Phase 2 to Phase 3. Analyzing
the dual informed managers’ scenario leads to qualitatively similar results (see
Figure 3.11). From anecdotal evidence and historical data, we learned that
Manager A has much more experience in carrying out ad campaigns in terms
of both how long he/she has been working and how many ad campaigns he/she
has dealt with. Thus our results imply that while the organizational design
has an impact on the profit levels as compared to those from the simulated
scenarios, experience of a manager also plays a big role in either strengthening
or weakening the magnitude of the impact.
〈〈Figures 3.9 and 3.11 about here〉〉
3.5.3.4 Robustness Checks
To improve the robustness of our analysis, we address a couple of dis-
tinctive issues with the time series data. First, we check if there is any sea-
sonal pattern in the dependent variables discussed in Sections 3.5.3.1 through
3.5.3.3. We used a range of functions such as Fourier terms (pairs of sine and
cosine functions) or splines, but we found that the association between the
intervention and the outcome variables are largely unaffected. Second, we test
whether our empirical model captures a causal effect in periods where there is
no intervention. In other words, we test whether or not we are able to observe
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a continuous trend or line in the absence of an intervention. We look to the
regression-discontinuity literature (see [28]) for this analysis. In implementing
this robustness test, we test for interruptions by replacing the true intervention
with other pseudo-interventions in the pre-intervention time period. We adopt
a simple iterative process of testing each pre-intervention time periods as the
pseudo-intervention. We did not find any statistically significant estimates
from these robustness tests with pseudo-interventions, which provides strong
support that our empirical framework presents causal impact of the change in
organizational designs. Lastly, we add more relevant control variates to our
empirial specification to check whether the prediction intervals in, for exam-
ple, Figures 3.5 and 3.9 are robust to different specifications. Specifically, we
add the exchange and network CPMs, cE,t and cN,t, which are important fac-
tors driving the managers’ decisions to the general ARIMA model in Equation
(3.13) and rerun the ITS analysis (see Figures 3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, 3.10, and 3.12).
We find that our results from Sections 3.5.3.1 through 3.5.3.3 are qualitatively
similar to this specification.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated how the organizational design of a firm
can affect its ability to recognize and exploit the cross-channel complemen-
tarities in the context of online advertising. To the best of our knowledge,
our study takes the first step of empirically verifying whether a firm’s decision
making structure makes a difference in the performance effects of complemen-
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tarities. Through our unique dataset which provided a natural experimental
setting with three different phases of organizational design, we initially focused
on estimating the spillover effects across two different channels using a itera-
tive 3SLS approach. After establishing that complementarities are present, we
then explore the effect of centralization versus decentralization on recogniz-
ing and exploiting the synergy effects by using simulation and counterfactual
analysis. We find that the centralized mode, with a single manager for both
channels, better recognizes and incorporates complementarities between the
two channels into its decision making, while the decentralized mode with two
managers, one in charge of each channel, systematically fails in allocating the
right amount of impressions in each channel, leading to less profit for the
agency. Our analysis demonstrates that the decision structure can make a dif-
ference in the performance due to more effective exploitation of cross-channel
synergies in an online advertising campaign.
The key implication of our results involves the need to train decen-
tralized decision makers to recognize and act upon complementarity (when
present), and to even consider reorganizing the decision making structure to
exploit such synergies. More specifically, our results underscore the need to re-
design the agency’s current organizational structure from specializing in media
buying (the status quo) to campaign based management, where one (or more)
decision maker(s) in charge of a campaign is (are) made aware of horizontal
synergies as well as informational aspects involved in the supply chain. The
status quo has separate and specialized groups of managers for the exchange
91
and the network. The current organizational structure reflects a rationaliza-
tion of the role of the agency in the supply chain based on economies of scale in
media buying and lowering search and transaction costs for the advertisers; it
is well-suited for exploring new publishers and brokers in the two channels, and
having access to their online content. However, our results suggest a broader
rationalization of the economic role of the agency, one which provides a sig-
nificant increase in profit potential by considering cross-channel interactions
when making decisions for each channel. Hence, we propose that the agency
group together managers in charge of similar campaigns, and either integrate
the network and the exchange management teams or ensure through interven-
tions that they understand the impact of synergies on their decision making
and agency profits. Such structural changes will involve additional costs of
cross-training managers as well as business process changes to move from a
silo mode of operation to a more integrated focus on the overall supply chain;
nevertheless, our numerical results also show that there is a significant upside
potential from such an initiative.
Our findings also show that setting the right incentive system is also
key to improved performance. The current incentive system in the agency
is based on the number of realized conversions each manager extracts from
his/her campaign. Naturally, the channel managers tend to put less emphasis
on the cost of impressions and even less on the potential interactions across
channels. A gainsharing system for each campaign may motivate the managers
to better work as a team and improve their campaign performances.
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3.7 Tables and Figures
Total Exchange
Total
Network
Total
Exchange
Daily
Average
Network
Daily
Average
Phase 1
Mille Impressions 279,682 235,268 44,414 4,127 779
Conversions 14,355 8,062 6,293 141 110
Profit 30,651 13,804 16,847 242 296
Pay Per Action 5.00 5.01
Cost Per Mille 0.16 0.50
Conversion Rate (%) 0.0051 0.0034 0.0142
Phase 2
Mille Impressions 229,843 213,274 16,569 3,385 263
Conversions 12,567 9,404 3,163 149 50
Profit 25,095 13,837 11,258 220 179
Pay Per Action 5.20 5.25
Cost Per Mille 0.17 0.37
Conversion Rate (%) 0.0055 0.0044 0.0191
Phase 3
Mille Impressions 947,212 860,010 87,202 14,333 1,453
Conversions 31,490 21,361 10,129 356 169
Profit 61,176 34,177 26,999 570 450
Pay Per Action 5.25 5.26
Cost Per Mille 0.09 0.34
Conversion Rate (%) 0.0033 0.0025 0.0116
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
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Variables log yE,t log yN,t
Intercept -0.8307∗∗∗ -0.5080∗∗
log xE,t 0.6413
∗∗∗ 0.0703∗
log xN,t 0.0954
∗∗∗ 0.6972∗∗∗
Phase 2 0.4396∗∗∗ -0.1586·
Phase 3 0.4591∗∗ -0.3183∗
Trend -0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0015
Adjusted R2 0.9156 0.9366
McElroy R2 0.9340
·p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 3.2: IV Estimation Results
Variables lnxE,t lnxN,t
Intercept −0.9792 −2.5089∗∗∗
ln pE,t/ĉE,t 2.2651
∗∗∗ -
ln pN,t/ĉN,t - 2.2206
∗∗∗
Phase 2 0.8843∗∗∗ −1.5537∗∗∗
Phase 3 1.4677∗∗∗ −0.8699∗
Adjusted R2 0.7121 0.6505
·p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 3.3: First-Stage Regressions of Impression Variables
94
Exchange
Impres-
sions
(%)
Network
Impres-
sions
(%)
Exchange
Conver-
sions
(%)
Network
Conver-
sions
(%)
Agency’s
Profit
(%)
Phase 1
Actual 100 100 100 100 100
Informed Dual 143 244 146 171 124
Informed Single 220 425 202 263 132
Phase 2
Actual 100 100 100 100 100
Informed Dual 110 578 118 259 167
Informed Single 192 617 174 313 177
Phase 3
Actual 100 100 100 100 100
Informed Dual 147 370 150 264 159
Informed Single 220 633 203 396 170
Table 3.4: Actual versus Other Scenarios
Partial Correlations Average Cosine
Similarity
Phase 1
Actual 0.48∗∗∗ 0.9780 (12.03)
Informed Dual 0.92∗∗∗ 0.9746 (12.94)
Informed Single 0.95∗∗∗ -
Phase 2
Actual 0.12 0.8491 (31.88)
Informed Dual 0.84∗∗∗ 0.8053 (36.36)
Informed Single 0.91∗∗∗ -
Phase 3
Actual 0.40∗∗ 0.9813 (11.09)
Informed Dual 0.93∗∗∗ 0.9846 (10.08)
Informed Single 0.96∗∗∗ -
Note. Partial correlations controlling for differences in price cost ratio between the Ex-
change and Network. Test is against the null hypothesis that the correlation is zero. The
numbers in parentheses in the cosine similarity column represent degree of angles.
·p < 0.1; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 3.5: Partial Correlations and Cosine Similarities
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Figure 3.1: Angle Between Actual and Single Informed Manager’s Impressions
Figure 3.2: Angle Between Actual and Single Informed Manager’s Impressions
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Figure 3.3: Angle Between Actual and Dual Informed Managers’ Impressions
Figure 3.4: Angle Between Actual and Dual Informed Managers’ Impressions
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Figure 3.5: Proportion of Actual Impressions to Single Informed Manager’s
Impressions
Figure 3.6: Proportion of Actual Impressions to Single Informed Manager’s
Impressions
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Figure 3.7: Proportion of Actual Impressions to Dual Informed Managers’
Impressions
Figure 3.8: Proportion of Actual Impressions to Dual Informed Managers’
Impressions
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Figure 3.9: Proportion of Actual Profit to Single Informed Manager’s Profit
Figure 3.10: Proportion of Actual Profit to Single Informed Manager’s Profit
100
Figure 3.11: Proportion of Actual Profit to Dual Informed Managers’ Profit
Figure 3.12: Proportion of Actual Profit to Dual Informed Managers’ Profit
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Chapter 4
On the Challenges of Detecting
Complementarities in a Structural Model
4.1 Introduction
We analyze complementarities in a dual-channel online advertising sup-
ply chain consisting of an advertiser, agency, publishers and brokers, and es-
timate their magnitudes using two distinct types of models: (1) one based on
instrumental variables (IV)1, and (2) an explicit structural model2 that ac-
counts for a decision maker’s optimizing behavior. The central question in our
research is how operating decisions accounting for (or ignoring) complemen-
tarities can affect the empirical evidence and the ability of structural models
to correctly measure such effects. Specifically, we demonstrate that if a deci-
sion maker (in our specific setting, a manager in the agency, who decides on
the number of impressions to use in both channels) ignores complementarities
(possibly due to a variety of reasons, including lack of cross-channel train-
ing, decentralized structure, etc.), an explicit structural model systematically
1As emphasized in [4], an IV framework enables us to disentangle complementarity from
clustered organizational practices.
2This model has been referred to as a more structural model by, for example, Brynjolfsson
and Milgrom (2012). This involves simultaneous estimation of a system of equations with
potential cross-equation restrictions.
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underestimates the complementarity effect, and can make true complements
appear to be substitutes, even when the decision maker’s behavior is correctly
reflected in the structural model. The IV approach, however, will correctly
identify the effects regardless of the decision maker’s ability to recognize and
act on complementarities. This result is driven by the fact that in an ex-
plicit structural model, suboptimal decisions force the researcher to make one
of two bad choices: either (1) make unwarranted assumption of the decision
maker acting on complementarity (when in reality the decisions are being
made naively) or (2) reflect the decision making deficiencies in the model,
leading in both cases to misspecification biases. By contrast, the IV model
is agnostic with respect to managerial behavior, and thus produces more ro-
bust estimates under these circumstances. The implications of our study are
that the researcher needs to have an in-depth understanding of the decision
process itself before developing a structural model. If s/he is unsure about
whether the decision maker recognizes complementarities, or is confident that
such interactions are being ignored, the IV approach will provide more reli-
able estimates of any potential complementarities than the structural model,
which may cause a significant bias in the estimates. An important caveat,
however, is that the IV approach can sometimes be highly inefficient relative
to the explicit structural model. Hence the researcher needs to introduce suf-
ficient relevant covariates and instrumental variables such that the variables
adequately explain the variations in the dependent variables.
In the extant empirical literature on complementarity in economics
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(e.g., [3], [4], [39]) and information systems (e.g., [8], [62]), no distinction has
been made between (1) the existence of complementarities in organizational
practices and (2) whether decision makers recognize and act upon such com-
plementarities. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt
to distinguish between the measurement of complementarities when decision
makers act or fail to act on them.
We study an online advertising supply chain, which involves an online
advertising agency who attempts to sell a product using two different channels;
a network of large publishers, and an exchange with real-time bidding for
impressions on publishers’ websites. The advertising network is a closed group
of agencies and publishers akin to a privately traded market, where prices are
determined through individual negotiations, while the advertising exchange is
a technology-driven platform that facilitates buying and selling of impressions
inventory with prices determined by a real-time-bidding (RTB) algorithm. The
agency buys impressions from the two channels, and a conversion is realized
when a customer carries out a measurable action, e.g., a customer makes
a purchase, provides information, or downloads an app, in response to an
impression. Then the agency is paid a price for each conversion from an
advertiser, and the agency’s profit margin is the difference between the revenue
they receive from the advertiser and the cost they pay for impressions spent
on both channels. Conversions in the two channels may not be independent as
the impressions are targeted at the same set of customers. However, it is not
clear if there are synergies present or if there is a substitution effect. That is,
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we do not know if increasing impressions in one channel will improve or hinder
the effectiveness of the impressions in the other channel.
4.2 The Online Advertising Supply Chain
In the online advertising campaign we study, the supply chain consists
of an ad agency, a network in which the agency runs ads on a single publisher,
and an exchange in which the agency buys impressions from a single broker
through real time bidding. At the beginning of a campaign, an advertiser
and the agency negotiate the pay per action (PPA)3 for the exchange and the
network, pE,t and pN,t, the prices paid by the advertiser to the agency per
each conversion. These prices can vary over the course of a campaign through
renegotiation between the advertiser and the agency, and can also be different
for conversions from the network and the exchange, though such variation
appears to be minimal in our data. Once the PPAs are set, the agency decides
the number of impressions, xE,t and xN,t, it wishes to spend in the exchange
and the network, respectively, given the cost per mille (CPM)4 in each channel.
Then, conversions, yE,t and yN,t, are realized in both channels, and the agency
is paid by the advertiser for all realized conversions in the network and the
exchange.
3PPA is the amount of money that the agency receives from an advertiser every time an
advertisement leads to a specified action (e.g., a sale, click, download, or subscription).
4The underlying assumption for the exchange is that every participant in the exchange
is a price taker. Moreover, the agency has a fair assessment of the CPM through extensive
learning before the launching of a campaign.
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Multiple studies (e.g., [1], [31], [57], etc.) provide theoretical and em-
pirical support for interactions across channels. If the agency considers the
inter-channel interactions in its decisions (we will refer to this scenario as the
informed agency), its view of the conversion process in a channel in its simplest
form will include impressions from the other channel as
yE,t = AEx
αE
E,tx
βE
N,te
uE (4.1)
yN,t = ANx
αN
N,tx
βN
E,te
uN (4.2)
where uE and uN are normally distributed with zero means, variances σ
2
N and
σ2E, and possibly nonzero covariances. The agency’s expected profit maximiza-
tion problem can be written as
max
xE,t,xN,t
piA = pE,t E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]− cE,txE,t + pN,t E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]− cN,txN,t.
(PM)
where E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t] = AExαEE,txβEN,te
σ2E
2 , E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t] = ANxαNN,txβNE,te
σ2N
2 .
Maximizing the expected profit with these conversion processes involves find-
ing solutions to a nonlinear system of equations given below:
∂piA
∂piE
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]
∂xE,t
− cE,t + pN,t∂ E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]
∂xE,t
= 0 (4.3)
∂piA
∂piN
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]
∂xN,t
+ pN,t
∂ E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]
∂xN,t
− cN,t = 0 (4.4)
We can estimate Equations (4.1) through (4.4) when the researcher believes
that the agency is informed.
On the other hand, although managers in the agency technically have
full visibility of decisions made in both the network and the exchange through
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the data management platform, we observed a decentralized structure of deci-
sion making and the complete lack of cross-channel communication and coor-
dination within the agency, as a result of which the managers did not consider
the interplay between the two channels in their decisions. Thus, while ideally
the agency’s perspective of the conversion processes in each channel should
be functions of impressions in both the network and the exchange (as shown
in Equations (4.1) and (4.2)), to model the decision process we actually wit-
nessed, we can define the agency’s naive view of the conversion processes in
each channel in their simplest forms as
yE,t = A
M
E x
αME
E,t e
uME (4.5)
yN,t = A
M
N x
αMN
N,te
uMN (4.6)
where uMN and u
M
E are normally distributed with zero means and variances(
σMN
)2
and
(
σME
)2
(and possibly nonzero covariances), and where the super-
script M represents the naive agency. The maximizing condition then yields
the optimal numbers of impressions, xME,t and x
M
N,t, which are functions of the
price-cost ratio in their respective channels:
xME,t =
(
AME α
M
E
(
pE,t
cE,t
)
e
(σME )
2
2
) 1
(1−αME )
(4.7)
xMN,t =
(
AMN α
M
N
(
pN,t
cN,t
)
e
(σMN )
2
2
) 1
(1−αMN )
(4.8)
We will use these insights from the naive agency’s problem in choosing our
instruments in our IV analyses in Section 4.3. Moreover, in later sections
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we estimate Equations (5) through (8) when the researcher believes that the
agency is naive.
4.3 Data Description and Instrumental Variables Anal-
yses
We use data from an online advertising agency to test spillovers be-
tween the exchange and network channels. We study an advertiser who ran
online campaigns on both channels through the ad agency for 272 days. The
advertiser provides an online service, and a conversion for the advertiser’s cam-
paign is a subscription to its website. Table 4.1 provides descriptive statistics
for the campaign we study.
〈〈Table 4.1 about here〉〉
Each observation in our dataset consists of a day of operations. In each row,
we have the number of impressions, the number of conversions, PPA values,
revenue, cost, and profit levels corresponding to the publisher in the network
and the broker in the exchange. We then use this information to further
construct additional variables such as the CPM values and conversion rates
(CR) for each channel. The typical industry definition of CR is the number of
conversions from an ad divided by the number of clicks on the ad, i.e., CR =
conversions/clicks. In this paper, however, we will define CR to be the number
of conversions divided by the number of impressions. Also, since the actual
CPM bids are not available in our analysis, we instead use the average daily
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CPM as a proxy for the actual bids.
The estimation process is carried out in two main steps. First, we esti-
mate dynamic regression models (AR(1)) for the CPM values in each channel
with respective lagged conversion rate as a regressor and use the fitted values
from the models to use as bases for the managers’ beliefs about the CPMs in
making decisions for how much impressions to spend on any given day. Second,
we estimate the conversion functions using a two-stage least squares (2SLS,
[2]) approach with instrumental variables constructed from insights we gained
from the previous section. We describe each step in more detail below.
4.3.1 Dynamic Regression Model for CPM
When making decisions on how many impressions to spend in each
channel, the managers in the agency form a belief about the daily average CPM
on a given day based on past history. To mimic this belief forming process,
we estimate dynamic regression models for the CPM values and use the fitted
values from the models as the agency managers’ beliefs. More specifically, we
observe that the CPM values are generally sticky, i.e., they largely depend
on previous period’s CPM, cE,t−1 and cN,t−1. They also depend on previous
period’s conversion rates, CRE,t−1 and CRN,t−1, respectively. The higher the
conversion rate in the previous period, the larger the CPM bid by the agency
so as to secure advertising slots.
We thus estimate a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) dynamic regres-
sion model for each channel with previous period’s conversion rate as a regres-
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sor. For the exchange we have
cE,t = θ0 + θ1CRE,t−1 + ηt,
ηt = φηt−1 + t
where φ is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient and t is white noise which
represents the part of CPM that cannot be explained by this model. We can
write a similar equation for the network CPM. The fitted values from these
models, ĉE,t and ĉN,t, represent the agency’s belief about the CPMs which are
used to make decisions on the impressions.
4.3.2 Estimation of Conversion Functions
We now estimate the conversions from each channel on day t, yE,t and
yN,t via 2SLS. After log transformation the conversion functions can be written
as follows:
ln yE,t = lnAE + αE lnxE,t + βE lnxN,t + κETrend+ uE,t (4.9)
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN lnxN,t + βN lnxE,t + κNTrend+ uN,t (4.10)
If the sum of the elasticities, α and β, in each equation is less than one, as our
empirical analysis will later show, the conversion process exhibits decreasing
returns to scale; in this case each incremental amount of online advertising
causes a lesser increase in conversions, which may be explained as a result of
advertising saturation. The coefficients, βE and βN , reflect the inter-channel
or horizontal spillover effects, so if the coefficients are positive, then we can
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infer that there are positive spillover effects from one channel to the other.
Finally we include the trend variable to control for trend in our regressions.
Note that in each channel’s conversion equation its own impression vari-
able is potentially endogenous. That is, exchange (network) impressions, xE,t
(xN,t), are correlated with the disturbance, uE,t (uN,t), because it is very likely
that there are variables that affect both the conversions and impressions in
the same channel simultaneously. For example, increase in total traffic on a
website may drive both the impressions and conversions to increase. Impres-
sion variable from the other channel has less of this concern because it is quite
unlikely that there exists a common variable that simultaneously affects, for
example, both the exchange side conversions and the network publisher’s im-
pressions. Due to the above-mentioned endogeneity issue, the OLS estimators
are inconsistent. As emphasized in [3] and [4], we can use an instrumental
variables (IV) framework to disentangle complementarity from organizational
practices. This approach can provide a consistent estimate of the synergy
coefficients if one can find instrumental variables that satisfy relevance and
exclusion restriction assumptions ([24]), i.e., they should be correlated with
the corresponding endogenous regressor (relevance) and uncorrelated with the
error term (exclusion restriction).
Our analyses in Section 4.2 yield a natural set of instrumental vari-
ables. In particular, the number of impressions in each channel is a function
of the respective price-cost ratios in each channel (see Equations (4.7) and
(4.8)). Therefore we use these ratios, pE,t/ĉE,t and pN,t/ĉN,t, as instruments
111
for the impression variables, xE,t and xN,t, respectively. Both of these ratios
naturally satisfy the relevance condition.5 In addition, we would expect that
these ratios affect the conversions only through the impressions because the
general audience of the ads have no information about these ratios when they
are making their decisions to convert. With these instrumental variables, we
carry out the following 2SLS estimation procedure:
Stage 1: Estimate via ordinary least squares (OLS) the endogenous
independent variables, xE,t in Equation (4.9) and xN,t in Equation (4.10),
using instrumental variables, i.e., pE,t/ĉE,t for xE,t and pN,t/ĉN,t for xN,t, as
well as the trend variable in Equations (4.9) and (4.10). We then calculate the
predicted endogenous independent variables, l̂nxE,t and l̂nxN,t.
lnxE,t = ρE + λE ln (pE,t/ĉE,t) + µETrend+ νE,t
lnxN,t = ρN + λN ln (pN,t/ĉN,t) + µNTrend+ νN,t
Stage 2: Using the predicted endogenous variables from Stage 1, we
estimate the coefficients in Equations (4.9) and (4.10) via OLS.
ln yE,t = lnAE + αE l̂nxE,t + βE lnxN,t + κETrend+ uE,t
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN l̂nxN,t + βN lnxE,t + κNTrend+ uN,t
Table 4.2 summarizes the key results from the IV estimation, which indicate
that there are significant synergy effects between the network and the ex-
change. A one percent increase in the network (exchange) impressions induces
5There of course exists the assumption that the agency is a profit maximizer.
112
a 0.05% (0.08%) increase in the exchange (network) conversions. This shows
that decisions for both channels should be made in tandem after incorporating
their interdependencies in the optimization model, and that a failure to do so
will result in suboptimal decisions.
〈〈Table 4.2 about here〉〉
4.4 Structural Estimations
[9] note that if the researcher has sufficient insights into the specific
structure of the system, an explicit structural model can be estimated. Along
these lines, with the premise of profit maximization by the agency as given in
(PM), we develop a structural model, which is based on a system of simulta-
neous equations involving performance and demand equations.
4.4.1 Assuming Naive Agency
Based on our observations of the decentralized decision making process
in both the network and the exchange, as well as anecdotal evidence from the
managers in the ad agency, it became evident that there is no recognition of
potential complementarities across the channels. Thus, the first step of the
estimation involves a structural estimation in which we assume that the agency
does not act upon the synergy effects in its profit maximization problem. More
specifically, we estimate the following set of equations involving cross-equation
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restrictions:
yE,t = A
M
E x
αME
E,t e
κME ∗Trendeu
M
E
yN,t = A
M
N x
αMN
N,te
κMN ∗Trendeu
M
N
xME,t =
(
AME α
M
E
(
pE,t
cE,t
)
eκ
M
E ∗Trende
(σME )
2
2
) 1
(1−αME )
xMN,t =
(
AMN α
M
N
(
pN,t
cN,t
)
eκ
M
N ∗Trende
(σMN )
2
2
) 1
(1−αMN )
Rewriting the above expressions and taking logarithmic transformations yield
a set of linear equations. We also add disturbance terms to the third and
fourth equations to explain deviations from the optimizing conditions due to
managerial errors. We can estimate the above set of equations through gen-
eralized least squares or seemingly unrelated regression (SUR, [59]) where we
allow the disturbances to be contemporaeously correlated, i.e., we specify an
unrestricted variance-covariance matrix for the error terms. From the above
estimation, we compute the fitted values, l̂nxE,t and l̂nxN,t, and we estimate
the following two equations
ln yE,t = lnAE + αE l̂nxE,t + βE l̂nxN,t + κETrend+ vE,t
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN l̂nxN,t + βN l̂nxE,t + κNTrend+ vN,t
It is worth noting the differences between the coefficients from the first stage
estimation, αME and α
M
N , and the coefficients from the second stage estimation,
αE, βE, αN , and βN . The coefficients from the first stage estimation represent
the agency’s belief about the conversion process. As noted above, the agency
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fails to recognize potential synergy effects between the two channels, and thus
believes that the conversion process in each channel is a solely a function of the
respective impressions in each channel. On the other hand, the second stage
estimation yields the set of coefficients which are of interest to the researcher
based on the fitted values from the first stage estimation, which are now free
from endogeneity issues.
4.4.2 Assuming Informed Agency
We then move on to empirically quantifying the bias in the coefficients
had the researcher misspecified the model by assuming the agency does act
upon complementarities. To verify this, we estimate the following set of equa-
tions:
yE,t = A
U
Ex
αUE
E,tx
βUE
N,te
κUE∗Trendeu
U
E (4.11)
yN,t = A
U
Nx
αUN
N,tx
βUN
E,te
κUN∗Trendeu
U
N (4.12)
∂piA
∂piE
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]
∂xE,t
− cE,t + pN,t∂ E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]
∂xE,t
= 0 (4.13)
∂piA
∂piN
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t|xE,t, xN,t]
∂xN,t
+ pN,t
∂ E [yN,t|xN,t, xE,t]
∂xN,t
− cN,t = 0 (4.14)
Notice that the third and fourth equations which represent the first-order con-
ditions for the impression variables are nonlinear. Thus, we utilize an iterative
nonlinear SUR estimation technique which we describe below in detail:
Step 1: Using the 2SLS estimates from Section 4.3, AE, aE, bE, AN ,
aN , and bN , initialize the expected values of yE and yN and plug these into
Equations (4.13) and (4.14).
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Step 2: Estimate the system of equations (4.11) through (4.14) and
compute the fitted values ŷE and ŷN .
Step 3: Plug the fitted values, ŷE and ŷN , from Step 2 into Equations
(4.13) and (4.14) and re-estimate the system of equations (4.11) through (4.14).
Step 4: Repeat Steps 1 to 3 until the difference between the fitted
values from successive iterations is within the prespecified tolerance level.
For estimation in each iteration, we minimize r
′ (
diag(S)−1OLS ⊗ I
)
r
where r is a column vector for the residuals for each equation, S is the variance-
covariance matrix6. We then compute the fitted values from the iterative
nonlinear SUR estimation, l̂nxE,t and l̂nxN,t, and estimate the following two
equations
ln yE,t = lnAE + αE l̂nxE,t + βE l̂nxN,t + κETrend+ vE,t
ln yN,t = lnAN + αN l̂nxN,t + βN l̂nxE,t + κETrend+ vN,t
Again, there is an important difference between the coefficients from the first
estimation, αUE, β
U
E , α
U
N , and β
U
N , and those from the second, αE, βE, αN ,
and βN . The first set of coefficients refer to the researcher’s belief about
the agency’s understanding of the conversion process, while the second set
of coefficients, which is based on the endogeneity-free fitted values from the
first-stage estimation, pertain to the actual conversion process. Table 4.3
summarizes the results from the explicit structural estimations. Notice that
6The SUR uses the variance-covariance matrix from an OLS solution.
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the magnitude of the cross-channel spillover coefficients reduced drastically
relative to the IV estimates. For example, the spillover coefficient from the
network impressions to the exchange conversions went from 0.1048 in the IV
results to 0.0478 and 0.0972 in the explicit structural estimation results. The
findings indicate that if the agency ignores synergy effects between the two
channels, the resulting decisions are suboptimal, and that the channels may
appear to be less complementary regardless of the researcher’s assumptions.
〈〈Table 4.3 about here〉〉
4.5 Verification through Simulations
The results from Section 4.4 are further explored through simulation
and counterfactual analysis. Our objective in this section is to investigate how
a decision maker’s understanding of complementarities and the researcher’s
knowledge of such understanding can affect the empirical evidence of comple-
mentarities or substitutabilities.
4.5.1 Naive Agency
In the first set of simulations, we simulate the agency’s decision on the
premise that the agency makes independent decisions for each channel. That
is, the agency does not take into account the potential cross-channel effects
when optimizing for the number of impressions in each channel. The simu-
lation procedure is outlined. We first simulate the agency’s decisions using
the coefficients, AME = 1, α
M
E = 0.55, A
M
N = 1, and α
M
N = 0.65. Specifically,
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on any given day, the agency’s decisions on the number of impressions are
generated using Equations (4.7) and (4.8) based on AME , α
M
E , A
M
N , α
M
N , and
added variances given the PPA and CPM from each channel. For simplicity,
we assume that the randomness associated with deviating from the optimal
impression levels are identical and independent. The coefficients used here
are the agency’s beliefs about the conversion processes. Based on the real-
ized numbers of impressions, the number of conversions are simulated using
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) with the coefficients, AE = 1, αE = 0.5, βE = 0.05,
AN = 1, αN = 0.6, and βN = 0.05; these coefficients represent nature or the
true underlying conversion process. On the simulated data set, we then carry
out a 2SLS estimation, a structural estimation assuming a naive agency, and
another structural estimation assuming an informed agency. We repeat this
procedure for a thousand iterations.
Table 4.4 summarizes the simulation results. The simulated data for
this table assumes that the agency acts naively, i.e., the agency does not
coordinate its decisions across channels. We find that IV estimation was able to
recover the coefficients used to simulate the conversions (βIVE = 0.0510, β
IV
N =
0.495). On the other hand, the explicit structural estimations failed to do so
regardless of the researcher’s belief about the agency’s behavior. We observe,
however, that if the researcher is informed about the agency’s behavior, there
is less bias in the coefficients (βE = 0.0450, βN = 0.447) than that of the
uninformed researcher who assumes informed agency when in fact the agency
is naive (βE = 0.0602, βN = 0.591). Note also that the direction of the bias
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is different. We further perform the z-test7 ([16]) to confirm that indeed both
sets of structural estimates are statistically different from the IV estimates.
〈〈Table 4.4 about here〉〉
4.5.2 Informed Agency
In the second simulation, we generate the agency’s decisions assuming
that the agency recognizes the potential synergy effects across channels and
that it incorporates this into its decision making, i.e., the agency makes coor-
dinated decision making. More precisely, in each iteration the agency’s daily
decisions are generated using Equations (4.3) and (4.4) with the coefficients,
AE = 1, αE = 0.5, βE = 0.05, AE = 1, αN = 0.6, and βN = 0.05, given the
PPA and CPM from each channel. Then, the conversions are generated again
using Equations (4.1) and (4.2) with the same set of coefficients. Lastly, we
carry out a 2SLS estimation and a structural estimation assuming an informed
agency. Table 4.5 shows that under optimal decisions both the 2SLS and the
explicit structural model are consistent. Both methods were able to recover
the coefficients used to generate the conversions. z-tests on the coefficients
confirm that the structural estimates are statistically similar to the IV esti-
mates. The results from Tables 4 and 5 together imply that for the researcher
to correctly identify the effect of complementarities through explicit structural
estimations, two requirements have to be satisfied concurrently: (1) the de-
7The z-test for the difference between two regression coefficients is z = β1−β2√
(SEβ1)2+(SEβ2)2
.
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cision maker has to recognize the effect and incorporate it into its decision
making, and (2) the researcher has to have a deep understanding of the deci-
sion maker’s behavior (perhaps from actual observations, as in our study) and
apply that knowledge in the structure of the econometric model.
〈〈Table 4.5 about here〉〉
4.5.3 Ill-informed Agency
Our last set of simulation involves an agency that believes that the
two channels, the exchange and network, are substitutes when they are in
fact complements. Specifically, in each iteration the impressions for the two
channels are generated using Equations (4.3)) and (4.4) with the coefficients,
AE = 1, αE = 0.6, βE = −0.05, AE = 1, αN = 0.7, and βN = −0.05.
Then, based on the realized impressions, the conversions are simulated using
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) with the coefficients, AE = 1, αE = 0.5, βE = 0.05,
AN = 1, αN = 0.6, and βN = 0.05. On this data set, we run an IV regression
and a structural estimation outlined in Section 4.4.2. Table 4.6 summarizes the
estimation results. We again find that the IV estimates recover the coefficients,
but the structural estimates have a slight upward bias because of which they
are statistically different from the IV estimates.
〈〈Table 4.6 about here〉〉
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4.6 Conclusion and Future Research
We analyzed and quantified synergies between channels in an online
advertising supply chain in order to study how a decision maker’s understand-
ing of complementarity affects the ability of the researcher to extract evidence
of such synergies from a structural model. To the best of our knowledge, our
study takes the first step of distinguishing between the presence of comple-
mentarity and acting upon it to achieve superior performance. We empirically
verified that the decision maker’s lack of understanding of complementarity can
make true complements appear to be substitutes in a structural model. Thus,
the utilization of explicit structural models requires a detailed understanding
of the decision making process, which can arise out of actually observing how
decisions are made in the real world. We find that regardless of the researcher’s
beliefs about the nature of decision making, complementarities, when present,
can be accurately measured in a structural model only when decision makers
act upon them. Therefore, researchers should be cautious about the utilization
of explicit structural models to measure complementarities. We also showed
that IV models will lead to more reliable results, regardless of whether the
decision maker is naive or informed about complementarities. Taken together,
these results suggest when the researcher is unsure about the decision making
process or is aware that potential complementarities may be ignored by the
decision maker, the IV approach is likely to produce more accurate results
than a structural model.
A key practical implication of our results involves the need to train
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decision makers to recognize and act upon complementarity (when present),
and to even consider reorganizing the decision making structure. For example,
we conjecture that the lack of understanding of complementarity across the
network and the exchange can partly be attributed to the decentralized nature
of decision making by media platform specialists in each channel.
Our future research will focus on developing a theoretical understanding
of the bias in the interaction coefficients when the decision maker ignores
complementarities. With such a theoretical foundation, we expect to be able
to further generalize the result, and to apply our findings to a broad range of
problem settings.
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4.7 Tables
Total Exchange
Total
Network
Total
Exchange
Average
Network
Average
Mille Impressions 31,769 22,082 9,687 127 56
Conversions 7,066 4,499 2,567 26 15
Revenue 36,174 23,159 13,015 133 75
Cost 22,707 14,244 8,463 82 49
ROI (%) 59 63 54
CR (%) 0.0222 0.0204 0.0265
Pay Per Action 5.14 5.15
Cost Per Mille 0.79 0.98
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variables log yE,t log yN,t
Intercept -0.8602∗∗∗ -1.1682∗∗∗
log xE,t 0.7828
∗∗∗ 0.1074∗∗∗
log xN,t 0.1048
∗∗∗ 0.8327∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.8725 0.8438
·p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 4.2: IV Estimation Results
Variables log yE,t log yN,t
Naive Agency
log xE,t 0.8077
∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗
log xN,t 0.0478
· 0.8434∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.6665 0.8207
Informed Agency log xE,t 0.7827
∗∗∗ -0.0227∗
(First Stage) log xN,t 0.0187
· 0.8420∗∗∗
Informed Agency log xE,t 0.7649
∗∗∗ 0.1359∗
(Second Stage) log xN,t 0.0972
· 0.8037∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.6469 0.8117
·p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001
Table 4.3: Structural Estimation Results
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Variables log yE,t log yN,t
IV Estimation
log xE,t 0.5005 0.0495
log xN,t 0.0510 0.6016
Naive Agency log xE,t 0.5489 -
(First Stage) log xN,t - 0.6504
Naive Agency log xE,t 0.5118 0.0447
(Second Stage) log xN,t 0.0450 0.6222
Informed Agency log xE,t 0.5516 -0.0015
(First Stage) log xN,t -0.0118 0.6574
Informed Agency log xE,t 0.5093 0.0591
(Second Stage) log xN,t 0.0602 0.6148
Table 4.4: Structural Estimation Results on Simulated Data Assuming Naive
Agency
Variables log yE,t log yN,t
IV Estimation
log xE,t 0.4981 0.0494
log xN,t 0.0525 0.6025
Informed Agency log xE,t 0.5182 0.0363
(First Stage) log xN,t 0.0426 0.6137
Informed Agency log xE,t 0.4964 0.0520
(Second Stage) log xN,t 0.0524 0.6092
Table 4.5: Structural Estimation Results on Simulated Data Assuming In-
formed Agency
Variables log yE,t log yN,t
IV Estimation
log xE,t 0.5000 0.0487
log xN,t 0.0501 0.5991
Structural Estimation log xE,t 0.5970 -0.0647
(First Stage) log xN,t -0.0415 0.6422
Structural Estimation log xE,t 0.5241 0.0695
(Second Stage) log xN,t 0.0588 0.6775
Table 4.6: Structural Estimation Results on Simulated Data Assuming Ill-
informed Agency
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Proofs to Mathematical Results in Chapter 2
Proposition 1. Assume that β¯E and β¯N are non-negative, i.e., there are non-
negative spillovers across channels. Then the following statements hold.
1. The agency’s expected profit function piA is supermodular in x¯E,t and x¯N,t.
2. The agency’s optimal decisions, x¯∗E,t and x¯
∗
N,t, can be selected such that they
are non-decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-increasing in cE,t and cN,t.
Proof. 1. Since the expected profit function is twice-continuously differentiable,
it suffices to show that the cross-partial of piA with respect to x¯E,t and x¯N,t is
non-negative. Note that
∂piA
∂x¯E,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂x¯E,t
+ pN,t
∂ E [yN,t]
∂x¯E,t
− cE,t
∂piA
∂x¯N,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂x¯N,t
+ pN,t
∂ E [yN,t]
∂x¯N,t
− cN,t
∂2piA
∂x¯E,t∂x¯N,t
= pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂x¯E,t∂x¯N,t
+ pN,t
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂x¯E,t∂x¯N,t
≥ 0
Since it is assumed that β¯E and β¯N are non-negative, the above expression is
non-negative, and thus piA is supermodular in x¯E,t and x¯N,t.
2. Also, we have
∂2piA
∂x¯E,t∂pE,t
> 0,
∂2piA
∂x¯E,t∂cE,t
< 0,
∂2piA
∂x¯E,t∂pN,t
≥ 0, ∂
2piA
∂x¯E,t∂cN,t
= 0,
and
∂2piA
∂x¯N,t∂pN,t
> 0,
∂2piA
∂x¯N,t∂cN,t
< 0,
∂2piA
∂x¯N,t∂pE,t
≥ 0, ∂
2piA
∂x¯N,t∂cE,t
= 0,
Hence, by Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem, the greatest and least elements in
the solution pair, x¯∗E,t and x¯
∗
N,t, are non-decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are
non-increasing in cE,t and cN,t. Moreover, if the solution pair is unique, then
the solution pair is guaranteed to satisfy the above properties.
Corollary 1.1. Assume that β¯E and β¯N are non-positive, i.e., there are non-positive
spillovers across channels. Then the following statements hold.
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1. The agency’s expected profit function piA is submodular in x¯E,t and x¯N,t.
2. The agency’s optimal decision, x¯∗E,t
(
x¯∗N,t
)
, can be selected such that it is
non-decreasing (non-increasing) in pE,t and cN,t, and is non-increasing (non-
decreasing) in pN,t and cE,t.
Proposition 2. Assume that βE and βN are non-negative, i.e., there are non-
negative spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂
2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
≥ 0. (A1)
Then the agency’s expected profit function piA is supermodular in xE,t and wN,t, and
the agency’s optimal decisions, x∗E,t and w
∗
N,t, can be selected such that they are non-
decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-increasing in cE,t. Further, if wN,t ≤ pN,t,
then x∗E,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
Proof. Note that
∂piA
∂xE,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xE,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t)∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
− cE,t
∂piA
∂wN,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t)∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− E [yN,t]
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂wN,t
= pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂
2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
So if the above expression for the cross-partial is non-negative, piA is supermodular
in xE,t and wN,t. It also follows that
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂pE,t
> 0,
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂cE,t
< 0,
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂pN,t
≥ 0,
and if wN,t ≤ pN,t we have
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂cN,t
= pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂cN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂
2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂cN,t
≤ 0
We have
∂2piA
∂wN,t∂pN,t
> 0,
∂2piA
∂wN,t∂pE,t
≥ 0, ∂
2piA
∂wN,t∂cE,t
= 0.
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Hence, by Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem, the greatest and least elements in the
solution pair, x∗E,t and w
∗
N,t, are non-decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-
increasing in cE,t. If wN,t ≤ pN,t, it also follows that x∗E,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
Moreover, if the solution pair is unique, then the solution pair is guaranteed to
satisfy the above properties.
Corollary 2.1. Assume that βE and βN are non-positive, i.e., there are non-positive
spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t) ∂
2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− ∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
≤ 0.
Then the agency’s expected profit function piA is submodular in xE,t and wN,t, and
the agency’s optimal decisions, x∗E,t
(
w∗N,t
)
, can be selected such that it is non-
decreasing in pE,t (pN,t), and is non-increasing in pN,t (pE,t) and cE,t. Further, if
wN,t ≤ pN,t, then x∗E,t is non-decreasing in cN,t.
Proposition 3. Assume that βE and βN are non-negative, i.e., there are non-
negative spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
(
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
−
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)(
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
≥ 0. (A2)
Then the agency’s expected profit function piA is supermodular in xE,t and wN,t, and
the agency’s optimal decisions, xISE,t and w
IS
N,t, can be selected such that they are non-
decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-increasing in cE,t. Further, if wN,t ≤ pN,t,
then xISE,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
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Proof. We have
∂piA
∂xE,t
= pE,t
(
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
− cE,t
∂piA
∂xN,t
= pE,t
∂ E [yE,t]
∂wN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+ (pN,t − wN,t)∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− E [yN,t]
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂wN,t
= pE,t
(
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
)
+ pE,t
(
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)
(
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
−
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
If the above cross-partial is non-negative, then piA is supermodular in xE,t and wN,t.
Moreover, we have
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂pE,t
> 0,
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂cE,t
< 0,
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂pN,t
≥ 0,
and if wN,t ≤ pN,t we have
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂cN,t
≤ 0
We also have
∂2piA
∂wN,t∂pN,t
> 0,
∂2piA
∂wN,t∂pE,t
≥ 0, ∂
2piA
∂wN,t∂cE,t
= 0.
Hence, by Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem, the greatest and least elements in the
solution pair, xISE,t and w
IS
N,t, are non-decreasing in pE,t and pN,t, and are non-
increasing in cE,t. If wN,t ≤ pE,t, it also follows that xISE,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
Moreover, if the solution pair is unique, then the solution pair is guaranteed to
satisfy the above properties.
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Corollary 3.1. Assume that βE and βN are non-positive, i.e., there are non-positive
spillovers across channels, and that
pE,t
(
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yE,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂ E [yE,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
−
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)
(
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂xE,t∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
+
∂2 E [yN,t]
∂x2N,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
)
+ (pN,t − wN,t)
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂2x∗N,t
∂xE,t∂wN,t
)
≤ 0.
Then the agency’s expected profit function piA is submodular in xE,t and wN,t, and
the agency’s optimal decisions, xISE,t
(
wISN,t
)
, can be selected such that it is non-
decreasing in pE,t (pN,t), and is non-increasing in pN,t (pE,t) and cE,t. Further, if
wN,t ≤ pN,t, then xISE,t is non-increasing in cN,t.
Proposition 4. Let k =
cN,tx
∗
N,t
wN,t E[yN,t]
, the publisher’s cost-benefit ratio (cost over
expected revenue). If k ≤ 1, then the optimal decisions, xPPSE and wPPSN , can be
selected such that it is non-decreasing in γ.
Proof. We have
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂φ
= −
(
wN,t
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
− cN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
)
∂2piA
∂wN,t∂φ
= −
(
E [yN,t] + wN,t
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
− cN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂wN,t
)
Rearranging the terms we conclude that by Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem the
greatest and least elements in the solution pair, xPPSE,t and w
PPS
N,t , are non-decreasing
in φ if
k ≡ cN,tx
∗
N,t
wN,t E [yN,t]
≤ 1.
Moreover, if the solution pair is unique, then the solution pair is guaranteed to
satisfy the above property.
Proposition 5. Let k′ =
cN,tx
∗
N,t
pN,t E[yN,t]
, the cost-benefit ratio (cost over expected rev-
enue). If k′ ≤ 1, then the optimal decision, xAPSE , can be selected such that it is
non-decreasing in γ.
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Proof. Note that
∂2piA
∂xE,t∂φ
= pN,t
(
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xE,t
+
∂ E [yN,t]
∂xN,t
x∗N,t
xE,t
)
− cN,t
∂x∗N,t
∂xE,t
Rearranging the terms we conclude that by Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem the
greatest and least elements in the solution, xAPSE,t , are non-decreasing in φ if
k
′ ≡ cN,tx
∗
N,t
pN,t E [yN,t]
≤ 1.
Moreover, if the solution pair is unique, then the solution pair is guaranteed to
satisfy the above property.
131
Bibliography
[1] Vibhanshu Abhishek, Peter Fader, and Kartik Hosanagar. Media exposure
through the funnel: A model of multi-stage attribution. Working Paper, 2012.
[2] Joshua Angrist and Alan B Krueger. Why do world war ii veterans earn more
than nonveterans? Journal of labor economics, 12(1):74–97, 1994.
[3] Ashish Arora. Testing for complementarities in reduced-form regressions: A
note. Economics Letters, 50(1):51–55, 1996.
[4] Susan Athey and Scott Stern. An empirical framework for testing theories
about complimentarity in organizational design. Working Paper, 1998.
[5] Robert L Bray and Haim Mendelson. Information transmission and the bull-
whip effect: An empirical investigation. Management Science, 58(5):860–875,
2012.
[6] Trevor S Breusch. Maximum likelihood estimation of random effects models.
Journal of Econometrics, 36(3):383–389, 1987.
[7] Carol V Brown and Sharon L Magill. Reconceptualizing the context-design
issue for the information systems function. Organization Science, 9(2):176–
194, 1998.
[8] Erik Brynjolfsson and Lorin Hitt. Paradox lost? firm-level evidence on the
returns to information systems spending. Management Science, 42(4):541–
558, 1996.
[9] Erik Brynjolfsson and Paul Milgrom. Complementarity in organizations. The
handbook of organizational economics, pages 11–55, 2013.
[10] Ge´rard P Cachon. Supply chain coordination with contracts, volume 11. Else-
vier, 2003.
132
[11] Ge´rard P Cachon and Marshall Fisher. Supply chain inventory management
and the value of shared information. Management Science, 46(8):1032–1048,
2000.
[12] Ge´rard P Cachon and Martin A Lariviere. Supply chain coordination with
revenue-sharing contracts: strengths and limitations. Management Science,
51(1):30–44, 2005.
[13] Donald T Campbell and Julian C Stanley. Experimental and quasi-experimental
designs for research. Ravenio Books, 2015.
[14] Fangruo Chen. Echelon reorder points, installation reorder points, and the
value of centralized demand information. Management Science, 44(12-part-
2):S221–S234, 1998.
[15] Fangruo Chen. Information sharing and supply chain coordination, volume 11.
Elsevier, 2003.
[16] Clifford C Clogg, Eva Petkova, and Adamantios Haritou. Statistical methods
for comparing regression coefficients between models. American Journal of
Sociology, 100(5):1261–1293, 1995.
[17] Thomas D Cook, Donald Thomas Campbell, and William Shadish. Experimen-
tal and quasi-experimental designs for generalized causal inference. Houghton
Miﬄin Boston, 2002.
[18] Ruomeng Cui, Gad Allon, Achal Bassamboo, and Jan A Van Mieghem. In-
formation sharing in supply chains: An empirical and theoretical valuation.
Management Science, 61(11):2803–2824, 2015.
[19] Ming Fan, Jan Stallaert, and Andrew B Whinston. Decentralized mechanism
design for supply chain organizations using an auction market. Information
Systems Research, 14(1):1–22, 2003.
[20] Anindya Ghose and Sha Yang. An empirical analysis of search engine advertis-
ing: Sponsored search in electronic markets. Management Science, 55(10):1605–
1622, 2009.
133
[21] Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker. Advertising bans and the substitutability
of online and oﬄine advertising. Journal of Marketing Research, 48(2):207–
227, 2011.
[22] Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker. Online display advertising: Targeting and
obtrusiveness. Marketing Science, 30(3):389–404, 2011.
[23] Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker. Search engine advertising: Channel sub-
stitution when pricing ads to context. Management Science, 57(3):458–470,
2011.
[24] William H Greene. Econometric analysis. Pearson Education India, 2003.
[25] Sang-Pil Han, Anindya Ghose, and Sung-Hyuk Park. Cross-channel synergies
between web and mobile advertising: A randomized field experiment. Working
Paper, 2013.
[26] Andrew C Harvey. Forecasting, structural time series models and the Kalman
filter. Cambridge university press, 1990.
[27] Yu Hu, Jiwoong Shin, and Zhulei Tang. Incentive problems in performance-
based online advertising pricing: cost per click vs. cost per action. Manage-
ment Science, 62(7):2022–2038, 2015.
[28] Guido W Imbens and Thomas Lemieux. Regression discontinuity designs: A
guide to practice. Journal of econometrics, 142(2):615–635, 2008.
[29] Pavel Kireyev, Koen Pauwels, and Sunil Gupta. Do display ads influence
search? attribution and dynamics in online advertising. International Journal
of Research in Marketing, 33(3):475–490, 2016.
[30] Martin A Lariviere and Evan L Porteus. Selling to the newsvendor: An anal-
ysis of price-only contracts. Manufacturing & service operations management,
3(4):293–305, 2001.
[31] Hongshuang Li and PK Kannan. Attributing conversions in a multichannel
online marketing environment: An empirical model and a field experiment.
Journal of Marketing Research, 51(1):40–56, 2014.
134
[32] Manoj K Malhotra and Alan W Mackelprang. Are internal manufacturing
and external supply chain flexibilities complementary capabilities? Journal of
Operations Management, 30(3):180–200, 2012.
[33] Puneet Manchanda, Jean-Pierre Dube´, Khim Yong Goh, and Pradeep K Chin-
tagunta. The effect of banner advertising on internet purchasing. Journal of
Marketing Research, 43(1):98–108, 2006.
[34] Larry J Menor, M Murat Kristal, and Eve D Rosenzweig. Examining the
influence of operational intellectual capital on capabilities and performance.
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 9(4):559–578, 2007.
[35] Paul Milgrom and John Roberts. The economics of modern manufacturing:
Technology, strategy, and organization. The American Economic Review,
pages 511–528, 1990.
[36] Suresh Muthulingam and Anupam Agrawal. Does quality knowledge spillover
at shared suppliers? an empirical investigation. Manufacturing & Service
Operations Management, 18(4):525–544, 2016.
[37] Ram Narasimhan, Morgan Swink, and Sridhar Viswanathan. On decisions
for integration implementation: An examination of complementarities between
product-process technology integration and supply chain integration. Decision
Sciences, 41(2):355–372, 2010.
[38] Sharon Novak and Steven D Eppinger. Sourcing by design: Product complexity
and the supply chain. Management Science, 47(1):189–204, 2001.
[39] Sharon Novak and Scott Stern. Complementarity among vertical integration
decisions: Evidence from automobile product development. Management Sci-
ence, 55(2):311–332, 2009.
[40] Marcelo Olivares, Christian Terwiesch, and Lydia Cassorla. Structural esti-
mation of the newsvendor model: an application to reserving operating room
time. Management Science, 54(1):41–55, 2008.
[41] Nikolay Osadchiy, Vishal Gaur, and Sridhar Seshadri. Systematic risk in
supply chain networks. Management Science, 62(6):1755–1777, 2015.
135
[42] Barry Alan Pasternack. Optimal pricing and return policies for perishable
commodities. Marketing Science, 4(2):166–176, 1985.
[43] Arun Rai, Ravi Patnayakuni, and Nainika Seth. Firm performance impacts of
digitally enabled supply chain integration capabilities. MIS quarterly, pages
225–246, 2006.
[44] Kevin Ross and Kristin Fridgeirsdottir. Cost-per-impression and cost-per-
action pricing in display advertising with risk preferences. Working Paper.
[45] Oliver J Rutz, Randolph E Bucklin, and Garrett P Sonnier. A latent in-
strumental variables approach to modeling keyword conversion in paid search
advertising. Journal of Marketing Research, 49(3):306–319, 2012.
[46] Juan Camilo Serpa and Harish Krishnan. The impact of supply chains on
firm-level productivity. Management Science, 64(2):511–532, 2017.
[47] Nicolaj Siggelkow and Daniel A Levinthal. Temporarily divide to conquer:
Centralized, decentralized, and reintegrated organizational approaches to ex-
ploration and adaptation. Organization Science, 14(6):650–669, 2003.
[48] Nicolaj Siggelkow and Jan W Rivkin. Speed and search: Designing organi-
zations for turbulence and complexity. Organization Science, 16(2):101–122,
2005.
[49] Jitendra V Singh. Performance, slack, and risk taking in organizational deci-
sion making. Academy of management Journal, 29(3):562–585, 1986.
[50] Joseph J Spengler. Vertical integration and antitrust policy. Journal of
political economy, 58(4):347–352, 1950.
[51] Douglas Staiger and James H Stock. Instrumental variables regression with
weak instruments. Econometrica, 65(3):557, 1997.
[52] Hu¨seyin Tanriverdi. Performance effects of information technology synergies
in multibusiness firms. Mis Quarterly, pages 57–77, 2006.
[53] Donald M Topkis. Supermodularity and complementarity. Princeton univer-
sity press, 2011.
136
[54] Catherine E Tucker. Social advertising: How advertising that explicitly pro-
motes social influence can backfire. Working Paper, 2016.
[55] Yixin (Iris) Wang, Jun Li, and Ravi Anupindi. Risky suppliers or risky supply
chains? an empirical analysis of sub-tier supply network structure on firm risk
in the high-tech sector. Working Paper, 2017.
[56] Elaine M Wong, Margaret E Ormiston, and Philip E Tetlock. The effects of top
management team integrative complexity and decentralized decision making on
corporate social performance. Academy of Management Journal, 54(6):1207–
1228, 2011.
[57] Lizhen Xu, Jason A Duan, and Andrew Whinston. Path to purchase: A
mutually exciting point process model for online advertising and conversion.
Management Science, 60(6):1392–1412, 2014.
[58] Sha Yang and Anindya Ghose. Analyzing the relationship between organic
and sponsored search advertising: Positive, negative, or zero interdependence?
Marketing Science, 29(4):602–623, 2010.
[59] Arnold Zellner. An efficient method of estimating seemingly unrelated re-
gressions and tests for aggregation bias. Journal of the American statistical
Association, 57(298):348–368, 1962.
[60] Arnold Zellner, Jan Kmenta, and Jacques Dreze. Specification and estimation
of cobb-douglas production function models. Econometrica: Journal of the
Econometric Society, pages 784–795, 1966.
[61] Arnold Zellner and Henri Theil. Three-stage least squares: simultaneous esti-
mation of simultaneous equations. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric
Society, pages 54–78, 1962.
[62] Kevin Zhu. The complementarity of information technology infrastructure and
e-commerce capability: A resource-based assessment of their business value.
Journal of Management Information Systems, 21(1):167–202, 2004.
137
Vita
Changseung Yoo was born in Daejeon, South Korea, the son of Yong Ok
Yoo and Ho Sook Kim. He received the Bachelor of Business Administration degree
from Yonsei University and the Master of Science degree in Operations Research
from Columbia University. He then applied to the University of Texas at Austin
for enrollment in their Ph.D. in Information, Risk, and Operations Management
Program. He was accepted and started graduate studies in August, 2012.
Email address: csyoo83@gmail.com
This dissertation was typeset with LATEX
† by the author.
†LATEX is a document preparation system developed by Leslie Lamport as a special
version of Donald Knuth’s TEX Program.
138
